Institutional constraints on rural development: An exploratory study of silk weaving in West Bengal by Banerjee, Debdas

IDS Information Resource Unit 
University of Sussex 
Falmer, Brighton BNI 9RE, UK 
PLEASE RETURN BY 
Occasional Paper 142 
INSTITUTIONAL C O N S T A N T S 
O N RURAL D E V E L O P M E N T . 
A N EXPLORATORY 
STUDY O F SILK W E A V I N G 
I N WEST B E N G A L 
LIBRARY 
13 J A N 1 9 9 5 
Institute of 
Development Studies » 
D e b d a s B a n e r j e e 
C E N T R E F O R S T U ^ m O O A L S C I E N C E S , 
10 Lake Terrace, Calcutta 700029 
IDS 
INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON RURAL DEVELOPMENT: 
AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF SILK WEAVING IN WEST 
BENGAL 
Abstract 
The market has expanded both at home and abroad; yet the conditions 
of production remain unchanged. Capital, though it appears as a coer-
cive social relation, has not been the principal means of production. 
The household organization of production constitutes the 'core'; yet its 
independent operation is non-viable. The cost-effective internal orga-
nization of the households is linked up with the market by the putters-
out, viz. the private silk merchants and the people's as well as non-
governmental organizations patronized by the state. The system de-
spite generating considerable surplus has kept the artisan's income 
depressed. The urban-biased development strategy coupled with feeble 
representation of the artisans have failed to invoke active state inter-
vention which otherwise would have unleashed the potential of the 
sector. 
1. Introduction 
The classic English 'Industrial revolution' which is often equated 
with 'cotton' tells us that before the 1770s, the cotton hand weavers as 
a body had not existed, and, by the late 1840s, they had effectively 
vanished. In three generations, the processes of economic change had 
first created and then destroyed a new type of labour (see, e.g., Bythell, 
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,969- chancer 3). Until the inventions of Hargreaves, Arkwng.it, and 
Crompton die drawbacks inherent in d,e spinning proccss .tad made . . 
extremely difficult to produce cotton yarn strong enough for a warp. 
However', the innovations m spinning in the 1770s did 
require technological upgradation in weaving in the form of say. 
„o verloom. The supply of weavers was adequate to work up nl, the 
y a r n produced hy dte new spinning machines. By .800, die sUiwne . 
of hand weaving relative to unproved spinning appeared to be a ccn-
s u ^ n g factor (Md). NeverUteless, powerloom firs, came to be used 
o n Z e scale in die cotton industry in die 1820s, fo.lowmg a n u m * 
of inventions and tnnovations in dressing and warpmg, and » the 
powcrloom-frame itself. The real a d v a n c e of dte power l o o m ^ 
U,at ,t enabled a manufacturer to predict with greater confidence when 
To der could be completed, and drat it gave him greater control ov 
die materials of manufacture, while, at dte same time, Ore wage costs 
r Pt depressed by employing low-paid women and children, in 
die factory ( L . chapter 4). The Cassic case, undoubted,y, ought to 
be evaluated in the proper histories! context. But drat su 1 provides e 
point of reference to any evaluauon of the condiuons of d.sparate de-
velopment in the third world. 
Silk has a steady demand in d,e domesuc as well as m interna-
tional markets, mainly in Western Europe and Nord, Amenca. The 
Crasue dee me of die industry in Japan, due particularly to die improved 
standard of living has called fordi a new intemadonal division of labour 
and dius brought in opportunities to India to reorganize this industry 
into a major exportable. Of course, the recent Bend in India,sexpo* s 
exhibits nn upwardly movement. West Bengal is die second taest 
producer of silk in India, following Karnauika, and roughly about 30 
per cent of her mulberry silk output is now being exported to foreign 
countries.1 The processes of production from mulberry plantauon up 
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to the weaving provide employment, paid and unpaid, to about a mil-
lion of the workforce, in the state. Following the standard literature on 
'trade and growth', it is usually understood that the expansion of mar-
kets would eventually lead to 'reform' of the underdeveloped labour 
market, in particular, and the upgradation of the technological condi-
tions of production, in general. 
Agricultural productivity in the state, however, has slowed down 
from the rate that it achieved particularly during 1980s, due to the 
comparatively low average yield of land under rice (cf. Economic Re-
view; and, field-survey data). The organized manufacturing sector in 
the state, on the other hand, reflects all the symptoms of stagnation, 
resulting in large scale shrinkages in employment opportunities 
(Banerjee, 1982, 1988). The foremost rural industries (see, e.g., for 
the products of brass and bell-metal, Ghosh, 1994; for products of conch-
shell, Sau, et. al., 1993) are also found to have lost their potential to 
absorb a sizeable part of the rural workforce. Only trading in land-
based commodities including fruits, vegetables and flowers, has been 
able to generate additional employment, to some extent. 
Mulberry silk production in West Bengal has a pretty long history. 
The colonial policy of free import of raw silk from China and Japan, 
and a simultaneous neglect of the domestic industry which eventually 
took the shape of a seed-borne and generic disease called 'pebrine', 
almost wiped out the industry in the state, by the turn of the century. In 
a later period the war-time demand during the World War II marginally 
saved the industry while noticeable improvements were observed only 
in the beginning of 1970s. It is highly labour intensive and is primarily 
organized by family-labour. Moreover, some branches of silk produc-
tion are overwhelmingly dominated by 'backward' castes who together 
constitute the bulk of the job-less people in the state. 
Silk is produced, in the countryside and in rural towns, in several 
stages such as mulberry cultivation, silkworm rearing, reeling and spin-
ning of cocoons, twisting of the yarn, and ultimately weaving. The 
'traditional' mediods that are applied in all the activities are labour-
intensive. Although the types of lands available in particular places 
laigely determined the location of mulberry cultivation of the older 
types, in the state, the new varieties of mulberry offer the opportunity 
to extend die cultivation to odier areas also. However, die districts in 
which die rearing and the reeling activities are mainly located, are char-
acterized by a comparatively high percentage of wage-labour to die 
aggregate rural workforce. Thus, apparendy, die availability of wage-
labour in mulberry cultivadon, rearing, or reeling activity is not a con-
straining factor. Furdier, it is found diat the rate of return per acre of 
agricultural land is highest in mulberry culdvation (if followed by silk-
worm rearing) among the major crops grown in West Bengal. But what 
intrigues one is that despite high profitability die magnitude of growdi 
remained substantially low (Baneijee, 1990). The downstream pro-
ductions viz., the reeling of yarn, and the weaving are also predomi-
npndy family-based domesuc acdvities. And, the rate of diffusion of 
improved technology in all the branches of production is extremely 
low. Moreover, die upward mobility is restricted in the sense diat diere 
are only a few instances of household enterprise getting transformed 
into an establishment. 
The Central Silk Board, Government of India, assisted with an 
hnernadonal Development Agency (IDA) credit of SDR 113.8 million 
(equivalent to US S 147 million) and a Swiss Development Coopera-
tion grant of SwF 40 million (US $ 25 million), has been implement-
ing, in addition to die 'routine' programmes, a sericulture development 
programme in India which began in 1989. There are public R&D insti-
tutions entrusted widi die job of technological improvement of die sec-
tor, and government sponsored autonomous marketing agencies to pro-
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vide outlets for tiie weavers' products. Yet, commercialization has failed 
to acquire marked traits in the sector as a whole. 
The present study, within its limited scope, constitutes only part 
of a broader project undertaken to elicit the inseparable relationships 
between tbe state, market, and social relations that impede/accelerate 
the growth process. In all of the three sectors of silk production what is 
common is the phenomenon of market failure. An organized market, as 
it is understood, is a particular type of institution for facilitating the 
exchange of goods and services via a medium of exchange (money), 
with the distinguishing features that the terms of exchange (prices) are 
public knowledge, access is open to anyone wishing to trade, and, of 
course, the agents are individually insignificant. We would certainly 
focus on the forms of market and exchange that characterize the sector. 
But attention would be paid more to analyzing the causes of market 
failures. As Newberry (1989) puts it: 'markets are not costless to orga-
nize and operate, and the potential gains from trade on a particular 
market may not be large enough to justify the emergence of an orga-
nized market. Even when the gains are sufficient, it may not be pos-
sible for the marketing agent to capture a sufficient fraction to cover 
his operating costs, and again the market will fail to emerge' (p.267). 
However, the effective rate of return, on the contrary, is found to be 
quite high in the underdeveloped markets. Besides, as it appears, rural 
institutions acquire certain forms depending upon the mode of appro-
priation through extra-economic coercion by the dominant rural power 
blocks. Such institutions survive as long as they continue to be per-
ceived by the gainers as useful instruments to exploit, and the techno-
logical changes that take place are not adequate enough to bring in 
tension within these; this tension is resolved with the emergence of 
new institution(s). But, changes in the institutions are occasionally 
contingent upon the society, as such (c/. Binswanger, et. al., 1993 
The consequences of change are always uncertain. And, risk aversion 
that typically characterises underdevelopment itself provides sufficient 
impetus to die preservation of current institutions. As Stiglitz (1989) 
has pointed out: 'individuals know more about die institutions and con-
ventions widi which diey have lived in die recent past than diey know 
of odiers by which diey might live' (p.26). 
The Gandhian ideology to give support to die village craftsmen 
towards the desired goal of Swaraj2 was later integrated to the develop-
ment strategy that came with the Second Five Year Plan. The content 
of the Small Industries Policy in die post-independence period, how-
ever, reveals that the spirit of Gandhism was abandoned, largely due to 
the compulsions of the capitalist development strategy (Tyabji, 1989). 
Gandhi's approach in regard to self-sufficiency, the ideal of clothing 
village population with khadi, and the rejuvenation of village life as a 
whole was largely replaced by production of khadi for sale (commer-
cial khadi, as it is called). The latter expanded considerably supported 
by substantial allocation of funds in the Five Year Plans which included 
interest free loans, subsidies and rebates, and grants for a larger admin-
istrative, supervisory and technical personnel. The producuon of self-
sufficiency khadi, however, fell both absolutely and relauvely. The 
actual implementation of the development work in respect of khadi 
and village industries, at the grassroots level, is carried out by regis-
tered institutions and cooperauve sociedes. To assess the success/fail-
ure of the local organizations it is important to understand the condi-
tions working for and against sustainability of such cooperation. 
The current trend towards a diminished role of the state in diird 
world economic activities including rural development activities, more 
as consequences of increasing debt burden and the corresponding ex-
ternal conditionalities, has stimulated the 'new' paradigm of develop-
ment economics tiiat reasserts new opportunities for local organiza-
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tions and institutions (LOIs) (see, e.g., Nugent, 1993; de Janvry, a!., 
1993; Thorbecke, 1993; Uphoff, 1993). These LOIs, in the literature, 
are considered as potential substitutes for either state or market fail-
ures3. It is true that many traditional LOIs, historically, originated where 
the state was virtually nonexistent and markets were imperfect and in-
complete. However, the strength and integrity of those LOIs were sub-
sequently eclipsed by the patchy state intervention and the underdevel-
opment of markets. Of course, die market forces by themselves may 
not suffice to ensure die success of the development process (Bardhan, 
1989). Nevertheless, that is a precondition for the new balance be-
tween the state, market and society to be economically viable (Streeten, 
1993). Why we have certain institutions, and not others, or why Uiese 
institutions take on die particular form diat they do - are some of die 
issues that lead us to the search for an 'optimal' balance between die 
diree institutions which would increase 'both the economic returns to, 
and the political feasibility of, the others' (Lipton, 1993: p.655). 
Hardin's (1968) "tragedy of the commons" states diat, in die case 
of commonly owned resources, each individual has the incentive to 
overuse the resources, regardless of what others do, thereby leading to 
die destruction of those resources. Only strong and appropriate inter-
vention by the state, according to Hardin, could save the situation. 
However, the neoinstitutional analysis of local organizations and insti-
tutions, using game theory, attempts to dismiss Hardin's contention, 
without any definite solution though. In these models, monitoring is 
still crucial. If mutual monitoring is not possible, the monitoring shou'd 
be by agents accountable to the members. And, as the size and hetero-
geneity of LOI's membership grow greater hierarchy may be necessary 
(Nugent, 1993). A norm of fairness which allows the actions to be 
sequential and everyone to adopt the behaviour taken by odiers, how-
ever, would have been die acceptable rule of the game in a Chayanovian 
economy (see Chayanov, 1987). One cannot rule out the rise of the 
'economic man' rendering mutual monitoring, or a fair monitoring by 
an agent accountable to die members of the LOI archaic, particularly 
after globalization of die domestic underdeveloped economy. 
However, a more fundamental problem widi die neoinstitutional 
analysis is that it ignores one crucial aspect of die operation of LOIs. 
Historically, the LOIs for production, or for marketing, or for both, are 
found to have taken shape in areas where the markets did not develop. 
In fact, particularly under die influence of Gandhian ideology, it had 
assumed die form of a 'movement' against market imperfection and 
die exploitation by the traders. While the LOIs are few in number in 
states like West Bengal diey are quite considerable in some other states 
such as Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra. But, generally, those LOIs which 
are numerically dominated by die upper and middle income-groups of 
people are found to be surviving for a relatively longer period of time. 
The success of die sugar cooperatives in Maharashtra, to note, is par-
ticularly due to the certainty in die market, government's price support, 
and, no less important, the monitoring role of the sugar factories. In 
general, due to market imperfection, the poor cultivators/artisans usu-
ally do not come up widi any surplus over and above the bare subsis-
tence. Thus, the external source of funds for working capital is one of 
die essential factors of production. Where land reform has vested rights 
to assets which are acceptable collaterals, the availability of institu-
tional finance is relatively easier. But even then the mortgaging of die 
tiny plot of land is the last resort diat a poor landowner would try to 
take on. Eventually, diey get interlocked with the private moneylend-
ers who accept various movable assets including such non-marketable 
assets as 'labour power' and incomplete property rights as 'future out-
puts' of the borrower. The formation of LOIs may have the approval of 
die state but such tilings as collective collateral are not acceptable to 
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the private moneylenders who always like to negotiate widi isolated 
individuals, since dieir business has no legal cover. Now, if the money-
lender has a direct interest in die outputs produced by die borrower, the 
terms and conditions of lending often may go against the collective 
interest of the LOI to which die borrower belongs. Odierwise, the high 
lending-rate is likely to induce free-riding among the members in their 
endeavour to recover 'costs' . 
The methodology followed in the field-enquiry is a judicious com-
bination of participant observation, conversational interviews, and the 
sample-based study that enabled us to make a quantitative analysis. 
Instead of adopting the rigorous sampling technique, we relied more on 
die combination of the three methods of enquiry into a field which has 
hitherto been explored too litde. We had limited knowledge, to begin 
with, of the domain of indigenous economy where economy, society 
and polity intermingle to resolve into particular processes of produc-
tion. Thus, a more structured enquiry was thought an incomplete tool 
of analysis, particularly in the field where informal 'ties' are wide-
spread. Anodier limitation of the present study is that often our conclu-
sions follow die estimation of 'monetary cost' and 'receipts' when the 
opaque forms of property and economic relations demand more rigor-
ous economic calculations based on an appropriate system of prices. 
In section 2 which follows we state the selection of the weaving 
centres. This is followed in section 3 with a brief description of the 
forms of organizing the weaving activity. Section 4 identifies some of 
the characteristics of the labour force. Section 5 deals with die analysis 
of the characteristics of silk weaving. And, in section 6, some conclud-
ing remarks have been made. 
2. Data 
The study is primarily based on data gathered from die survey of 
the three most important weaving centres, viz., Bishnupur (in the dis-
trict of Bankura), Mirjapur and Chawk-Islampur (both in Murshidabad). 
The outputs of diese diree centres include almost all of die varieties, 
known as die 'Bengal varieties', available in die market. However, 
each centre has its own distinguishing characteristics particularly in 
regard die organization of production and the output-mix. The market 
price varies with die 'variety' of die fabrics (c/. Appendix Table I). The 
variation in price is partly explained by die texture of die fabric but 
more importantly by die quality of die yarn used and die amount of 
skill involved in a particular fabric. Accordingly, die fabrics can broadly 
be classified into high, medium and low valued items. Bishnupur is 
famous for its high valued designed sarees known as Baluchari. And 
Mirjapur's products are usually medium valued and typically stand for 
the popular 'Murshidabad silk'. On the odier hand, Chawk-Islampur 
specializes in low valued reeled silk fabrics, and, of late, it has also 
become a growdi centre of spun silk fabrics. The latter type of fabrics 
has been experiencing a growing market at home and abroad during the 
last couple of years. Unless otherwise mentioned, the source of date/ 
information is invariably the field-survey. One may occasionally no-
tice the lack of information on 'aggregate', 'population', etc. at die 
micro/macro level. This is, however, a deliberate omission since the 
available organized data are simply not reliable, and we were not able 
to conduct complete enumeration. 
3. Forms of Organization 
There are broadly two types of entrepreneurs in silk weaving in 
West Bengal, viz., (a) diose who undertake weaving only, and (b) those 
who own reeling/spinning units and also put out work to domestic weav-
ers. While the former broadly comprises two different types of produc-
tion organizations, viz. (i) societies, and (ii) private silk merchants (popu-
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larly called Mahajans) die latter consists of only die societies. The 
number of weavers who operate independendy on owned looms is found 
to be significant only in Bishnupur. In Chawk-Islampur, which is known 
for its relatively low valued fabrics, the overwhelming majority of die 
weavers work under the societies. The participation of the silk mer-
chants in die processes of weaving is found to be significant only in 
Miijapur while in die other two centres they have reduced their activi-
ties to trading in silk materials only. 
The societies, strictly speaking, are not weavers' guilds There are 
two Registration Acts in die state guiding die formation as well as the 
functioning of die societies. The objectives of an 'industrial co-opera-
tive society', in particular, include manufacture and markeung of goods 
by or with the help of its members (ordinary artisans or small entrepre-
neurs carrying on business of the same kind carried on by it) and pro-
viding supplies and services to them and to small producers and entre-
preneurs. In order 'to give a healthy impetus and a sense of purpose for 
the co-operative movement in West Bengal, to provide for clean, 
devoted and efficient management .... to bring about economic and 
social regeneration including better and happier conditions of living 
for the weaker sections of the community . . . " (Preamble of the West 
Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1983), the law relating to coopera-
tive societies in West Bengal was consolidated in 1983. Every coop-
erative society existing at the commencement of this Act which has 
been registered or deemed to have been registered under the Co-opera-
tive Societies Act, 1912 or the Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1940 
or the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1973 is deemed to have 
been registered under this Act of 1983. All the members of such a 
society are equity holders and die net profit of the society shall be 
distributed among its members by way of bonus or dividend. 
On die other hand, die West Bengal Societies Registration Act, 
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1961 allows any seven or more individuals to form a society for chari-
table purposes. The object of this Act is to repeal the Societies Regis-
tration Act, 1860 in so far as it applies to West Bengal and to introduce 
in its place a new legislation with a view to making the Act comprehen-
sive and eliminate various irregularities and malpractices in the man-
agement of societies. Any society registered in West Bengal under the 
Act of 1860 was deemed to have registered under this Act of 1961. 
However, most of the charitable societies engaged in weaving and/or 
reeling are found to have floated with members who are closely related 
to each other, and thus largely constitute family-based business organi-
zations. 
The cooperative society is managed by a committee, and the big-
ger ones have about 30 permanent employees in addition to 10-15 
casuals, as office bearers. The superannuation of the permanent em-
ployees takes place at the age of 60. All the employees including the 
'casuals' are covered under the provident fund scheme. On the other 
hand, the management of the charitable society is entrusted to a gov-
erning body elected by the members. And, unlike the cooperative soci-
ety, the latter frames its own regulations regarding the overall manage-
ment of the organization, subject to the approval of the Registrar of 
Societies. 
All these societies (in short, 'khadi') engaged in the production of 
silk are certified by either the Khadi and Village Industries Commis-
sion (KVIC), or the khadi and village Industries Board (KV1B) in re-
spective states (for an outline of the khadi organization, see Appendix 
I) excepting a few who are directly under the Handloom and Textiles 
Directorate. These societies have different schemes of the Artisan Wel-
fare Fund (AWF) (like the contributory provident fund scheme for the 
organised sector employees). While in the societies under the 'Direc-
torate' the member-weaver contributes Rs.4 and an equal amount is 
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being contributed by the society, the state government, and the central 
oovernment, respectively, in other societies, certified by KVIC/KVIB, © 
a member pays Rs.8 and an equal amount is contributed by the Society. 
Further, in the societies under the 'Directorate' the member-weavers 
are supposed to maintain separate AWF accounts with the Post Office 
while in all other societies the organization itself maintains the AWF 
account. All the society-weavers are, however, entitled to receive in-
terests on the accumulated contributions. The society deducts the 
weaver's part of the contribution from the wages. The khadi society is 
also supposed to pay to the member-weaver, as 'puja bonus' , a sum 
equivalent to 10 per cent of his/her annual gross wage income from the 
society. In the better organized societies the weavers are covered un-
der the Group Insurance Scheme. 
The societies under the Directorate seem to posses a relatively 
flexible system of buying of raw materials and selling the finished prod-
ucts. In contrast, the KVIC/KVIB societies are supposed to organize 
reeling/spinning under their own umbrellas. Only in exceptional cases 
they could buy yarn from outside but that too only from the certified 
societies. 
The khadi societies have been entitled to loans for working capital 
at a concessional rate of interest, and used to receive grants for wages 
and means from KVIC/KVIB till recently. As part of the programme of 
restructuring Indian economy, KVIC has reorientated its policy and 
discontinued to advance loans directly, and has also withdrawn the sub-
sidy-scheme for 'wages and means'. Now, the khadi societies have to 
borrow funds from the commercial banks at an eight per cent rate of 
interest (or, as fixed by the Reserve Bank of India from time to time) 
while the 'apex' organization reimburses only half of the gross interest 
liabilities. The .KVIC depends on institutional finance, besides budget-
ary support for the implementation of its programmes. The KVIC is-
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sued, for instance, interest subsidy eligibility certificates to State KVIBs 
and directly aided institutions for an amount of Rs.234.27 crores in a 
single year in 1990-91 while KVIC received only Rs. 120.61 crores of 
institutional finance during 1990-91 (GOl, Eighth FYP, 1992-97: vol.11, 
chp.6). The Eighth Plan admits the necessity to increase the active 
involvement of banks in funding of KV1 programmes and puts empha-
sis on the reduction of the dependence of KVIC on the budgetary sup-
port. It has also been suggested: 'It is also necessary to review the 
subsidies which are presently being provided for the development of 
khadi and village industries. The present policy of KVIC to advance 
loans for the development of village industries to the beneficiary 
organisations at 4% rate of interest also needs to be reviewed in view of 
the hike in the lending rates of commercial banks' (GOI, Eighth FYP, 
1992-97: vol.11, p. 136). 
It seems the cooperative societies, in particular, are reeling under 
several constraints, and consequently the conditions of production be-
coming grey. First, KVIC issues periodic circulars on the prices of raw 
materials, wages for particular types of work, and also on the prices to 
be fixed for the produced goods, which the KVIC-societies are sup-
posed to follow. For instance, in the case of fixing the price of yarn, at 
which the societies are supposed to transact, KVIC takes into account 
the stipulated wages for the various categories of workers engaged in 
the processes of reeling. And, those rates of wages often vary from the 
wages at which private reelers employ hired workers. According to the 
Silk Khadi notification, the revised rates of wages for reeler and turner, 
which became effective since December 1, 1992, in West Bengal, are 
Rs.22 and Rs.21 per day, respectively. The current market wage rates, 
however, in the main reeling centre in Kaliachak, for instance, are com-
paratively high. Generally, for an average daily output of 400-500 gms 
of warp yarn, or 750-950 gms. of weft, a reeler in a private unit in 
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Kaliachak gets Rs.26, and a turner Rs.27, (when the period of employ-
ment is relatively longer otherwise the wages are more) excluding the 
'provisions' in kind offered by the employer, the market value of which 
would not be less than Rs.1.50. By comparison, the Society-rates have 
been fixed on the basis of a daily output of 380-425 gms of warp, or 
500-520 gms. o£ weft yarn, in 8 hours of labour. However, the com-
paratively low wages does not deter supply of labour in a labour-sur-
plus situation. The factor that really affects a Society is the higher 
costs of production as compared to private reeling. This perhaps ex-
plains the negligible participation of the Khadi Societies in reeling, as 
such. There are other non-market factors, too, which have been ana-
lyzed in a separate study (Banerjee, 1994). 
The cost of inputs, the wages for warping, weaving etc., the A.W.F. 
at the rate of eight per cent, and an ex-gratia at the rate of ten per cent 
add up to the prime costs. The total value of a fabric is then being 
determined by adding a margin of 25 per cent on the latter, which is to 
be retained by the Society. The retail value is, however, fixed by add-
ing 0.5 per cent as insurance charges, and, in case of loans taken from 
banks, 1.5 per cent as the charges for bank finance, on the total value. 
The outputs of the Society are usually marketed through own re-
tail sales counters approved separately by KVIC. The societies having 
no such sales counters usually sell the output to other KVIC-societies 
at a 12 per cent rate of discount. There is no bar on selling the output to 
private wholesalers. However, the latter are not entitled to the commis-
sion (at the rate of 12 per cent). This makes the private traders 
uncompetitive in the market with the Society's products. And, hardly 
any private wholesaler is found to be marketing the Societies' products 
in the domestic market. In the Khadi outlets in Calcutta the retail prices 
are 4 per cent higher than that in the weaving centres, on account of 1 
per cent as entry tax, and 3 per cent as transportation. Thus, if a fabric 
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is exported to Calcutta from Chawk-Islampur for sale, and then for 
some reasons is being re-exported to Bankura the price, at the latter, 
would be eight per cent higher than that at Chawk-Islampur. 
Apparently, the pricing of the KVlC-Society is quite rigid. Be-
ginning with the prices of cocoons (till recently when the regulated 
markets of cocoons have started functioning) up to the retail prices of 
fabrics the society is supposed to follow the price-chart fixed by the 
Eastern Zonal Certification Committee of KVIC, at Calcutta. How-
ever, the societies are found to be operating within a 'range' around the 
regulated prices. 
The official Cocoon Purchase Committee (CCPC) used to deter-
mine the Kakeme cost4, and the Committee, among others, was well 
represented by the societies. The system of pricing by the apex body, 
however, discontinued (since 12th March 1992) following the set up of 
a few regulated markets for cocoons by the state department of sericul-
ture (DOS) in the districts. By dint of an almost oligopsonistic bar-
gaining power KVIC/KVIB had been effective in depressing the kakeme 
rate. The price-chart prepared by the KVIC normally remains effective 
for a considerable period of time. If the kakeme rate had increased 
considerably in-between that would have affected the pricing of the 
KVIC-society. The KVIC, with the argument that the societies would 
face problems of marketing their outputs, used to put pressure on the 
CCPC to lower the kakeme rate, to the extent possible. The balance 
had to be accommodated by individual societies. This is no longer the 
case, now. 
The yarn prices, of course, vary according to the quality while the 
price-chart prepared by KVIC mentions only one set of prices for warp 
and weft. Accordingly, the retail value of any particular fabric pro-
duced by a society is fixed. However, the retail prices of the Society-
products at the Khadi retail sales counters hardly conform to the KVIC 
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regulated prices. The difference is partly explained by the texture of 
the cloth. 
The main outlets for the Society-products include the showrooms 
like Tantuja, Tantusree of the West Bengal Handloom and Powerloom 
Development Corporation Ltd. (WBHPDC), and West Bengal State 
Handloom Weavers' Cooperative Society Ltd. (Apex Society), as well 
as the Khadi Samities. Most of the Society-outputs are transacted on-
credit, the repayments take three to seven months and even longer than 
that. As a result, the societies encounter acute problem of working 
capital. The KVIC does provide 'soft ' loans but the formalities take 
long time, and hence the Societies quite often have to borrow funds 
from the informal credit market at an exorbitant rate of interest, at 
times of crisis. Thus, not all the societies are well-grounded to provide 
yarn to all the members in volumes that would be adequate for their 
full-time employment in looms for a 'gainful' period of time, in a month 
or year. Besides, when the yarn prices move upwardly the volume of 
inventory of the Society declines by a corresponding proportion. And 
given the limited volume of working capital at its disposal, this entails 
further shrinkage in employment of the member-weavers. Sometimes 
the curtailment of production, by a Society, due to the rising prices of 
yarn is a deliberate decision which follows from the fact that they could 
not instantaneously fix the fabric prices accordingly. 
The organization of production of the silk merchants (mahajans), 
on the other hand, may appear as that of a master-weaver but actually 
their forms of operation are more akin to that of a merchant. The weavers 
under these putters-out do not enjoy any kind of social security ben-
efits, let alone the 'puja bonus' or ex-gratia payments. Depending on 
the conditions of the market the investment-portfolio of the mahajans 
changes. Although they carry out trading in silk yarn and finished 
materials, and also take pan directly in the processes of weaving in 
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some of the weaving centres, the share of the respective activities 
changes quite frequently. They, however, do not dissociate themselves 
completely from 'manufacturing', wherever they have participated in 
it. The alienation from manufacturing would make their position more 
vulnerable. By dint of the system of putting out they have been able to 
manipulate the output mix according to market signals. This assumes 
particular significance when the mix contains non-standardized articles. 
4. The Labour Force , 
Bringing together hand workers into large workshops is by no 
means a characteristic feature of silk weaving in West Bengal. The 
majority of the silk weavers are employed in the traditional putting-out 
system of production. They work on their own looms in their own 
house, using materials obtained from the Society, or the mahajan. And, 
they use to receive piece-rate wages from the putters-out, according to 
the type and volume of work done. Thus, in this type of organization of 
production the key role is being played by the agent who actually put-
out the work to the individual weaver. There is no powerloom in the 
state. Moreover, such phenomenon as that a master-weaver having a 
number of looms, employing journeymen and apprentices is nonde-
script, except in Bishnupur. 
The head of the family is normally responsible for the execution 
of the work obtained from the putter-out, and the 'subordinate' mem-
bers of the family, i.e. the women, children and old people are being 
organized by the 'head' in an informal manner to ensure the comple-
tion of the work. For the subordinate members, however, this is a do-
mestic by-occupation; the other adult male members also take part in 
weaving. Most of the jobs of processing of the yarn (degumming, bleach-
ing, colouring for the coloured fabrics, and winding the weft) are nor-
mally being done by other members including the children. The office 
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of the Society or the gaddi (office) of the mahajan is usually located in 
close proximity to the weavers' sheds thus the transactions of the mate-
rials do not entail any considerable work-loss for the weaver who him-
self is supposed to do that. The weaver, however, by dint of his owner-
ship of tools is not an 'independent manufacturer', any more like an 
agricultural labourer who owns a sickle. The weaver's freedom is lim-
ited to the extent he has free access to raw materials. The 'indepen-
dence' of the weaver who owns a loom and also work with owned yarn 
is largely subjected to the conditions of the output market. It is the silk 
merchants who provide marketing channels for bulk of the output pro-
duced by independent weavers. 
Accordingly, the weavers could be stratified in order of their spe-
cific entitlements to 'income'. The economic conditions of those weav-
ers who are 'gainfully' employed under the societies seem to be better 
than those who are 'tied' to the mahajans. On the other hand, the eco-
nomic conditions of the weavers those who distribute their own labour-
time between the put-out job (by the societies and/or mahajans) and 
independent production with owned yarn, however, remain ambigu-
ous. Nevertheless, the socio-economic conditions of the weavers, as a 
whole, have become more vulnerable since they are, in general, di-
vorced from agriculture. The joint-production of agricultural and the 
domestic 'industrial' goods, as is understood, has negative impact upon 
the productivity of the latter. But, de-peasantization also has not proved 
to be worthwhile due particularly to structural deficiencies. 
5. The Weaving 
The locational specialization in the variety of silk fabrics, how-
ever, is not a direct consequence of the resource-base of the putters-out 
in the respective weaving centres. Some of the varieties like Baluchari 
or Jamdani have acquired the status of legend. The origin, downfall 
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and the rejuvenation of those 'legends' in some cases are spread over 
centuries. And. the rejuvenation, of a variety, like that of its emergence 
had always been subjected to the 'human embodied' knowledge of the 
society. The folk tales on the emergence of these three (selected) weav-
ing centres, in particular, and on the conditions of weaving in the past, 
run in numbers. These elements of 'tradition' have, in fact, kept alive 
instead of hindering popular initiatives to develop newer products as 
well as processes. 
Bishnupur is famous for its brocaded5 designs and richly coloured 
bordered sarees known as Baluchari. The latter has been experiencing 
brisk demand from mainly urban elite consumers for about last 10 years. 
As a result, the number of looms engaged in the production of Baluchari 
increased from 150 in 1991 to about 400 in 1993, in Bishnupur. Most 
of the looms added to the existing strength are, in fact, old and switched 
over from other types of cloth-production. The output, in turn, has 
increased from about 400 Baluchari sarees per month in 1991 to about 
1600 per month in 1993. There are altogether three cooperative societ-
ies and one charitable society. Notwithstanding, most of the Baluchari 
weavers are found to be unconnected with those. Another characteris-
tic feature of Baluchari weaving is that about 10-11 persons are associ-
ated with one active loom, which seems to be highest among all the 
varieties of silk fabrics produced in the state. 
The entire requirements of warp yarn used by the common weav-
ers are imported from Karnataka. However, the charitable society, one 
of the few exceptionals among such organizations, directly runs reel-
ing units in Malda and puts out Malda's warp yarn to the weavers in 
Bishnupur, also. The kind of warp that is used in Bishnupur, according 
to the weavers, is not being produced in the state. Our enquiry, how-
ever, suggests that there exists an information-gap between the produc-
ers and the users. The state-run filature unit at Madhughat, in the dis-
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irict of Malda, produces close substitutes of die Kamataka - warp, and 
is capable of catering to the demand of die Baluchari weavers. For die 
weft, however, diese weavers turn to Malda. They keenly gather infor-
mation on the success/failure of the cocoon 'crop' in Malda. 
Jacquard looms6 (throw shuttle type) are used in the weaving of 
Baluchari. Most of diem are of nineteenth century vintage, mostly 
from Manchester, but are still in working condition. This particular 
loom is predecessor to the computing machines in a great way. This 
loom is accomplished widi weaving designs simultaneously. The set-
ting up of the loom for a particular design is, however, very compli-
cated. 
Each loom is used to weaving a particular design generally for 
five to six years, and sometimes even for ten years. The infrequent 
changes in design is due particularly to the following factors. First, 
there are only five designers in Bishnupur who among diem share the 
entire local demand for 'designs'. It takes considerable time to com-
plete a design. For instance, the >rawing of a single - coloured design 
itself takes about two months. It is dien transferred to cards through 
the system of punching; this is done manually and by using a crude 
punching instrument. Punching of at least five thousand cards (for a 
single-coloured Baluchari) itself takes about three months. A bi-coloured 
design drawing along widi card punching takes six to seven months. 
Secondly, the cost of design is also quite high. For a single-coloured 
design the artist charges between Rs. 1,500 and Rs.2,000. A card puncher 
takes about Rs. 1,400. Added to these is the cost of the cards which is 
not less than Rs.2,000 per design (at die rate of Rs.40 per 100 pieces of 
cards). The total comes to about Rs.5,500. Similarly, for a bi-coloured 
design, the total iniual costs would b \ about Rs. 10,500. There are 
odier miscellaneous cost-items like loom-setting (warping, shedding7, 
etc.), loss of loom-time due to die fact that at least two full working 
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days ;ire required for loom-setting. Thirdly, as the designers are not 
educated formally anjj have no formal training in art they solely de-
pend on their imagination mostly stemming from the stories of 
Ratnayana, Mahabharata, and the calendar pictures. Their capacity to 
generate 'new' designs, which may satisfy changing customers' choice, 
is naturally limited. 
The adoption of Jacquard loom in Miijapur during the last six to 
seven years is an uncommon phenomenon, as compared to Bishnupur, 
and draws particular attention to the dynamics of 'human-embodied' 
technology. Usually, the designs on sarees are developed, in Mirjapur, 
in the ordinary wooden throw shuttle type looms fitted with 10-12 
treadles. About six to seven years ago, a seventy-year old weaver went 
to Bishnupur as a casual visitor and was surprised to find the Jacquard 
looms in operation there. The designers in Bishnupur are particularly 
quite secretive of their trade and thus he was not able to gather detailed 
information on crucial aspects of the Jacquard loom weaving. Not-
withstanding, his close observation of the operation of the loom itself 
later enabled him to construct a Jacquard-type loom of 100 hooks8. 
The old man himself had drawn a design and transferred that on the 
punch cards. And die first loom in Mirjapur successfully started opera-
tion with die yarn supplied by die Society, there. This innovation is, of 
course, die outcome of die person's organic involvement in die sector, 
and the motivation to improve the quality of the 'traditional' fabric 
produced diere. 
Technologically, die Jacquard loom is superior to the ordinary 
looms which are used in Mirjapur, in many respects. First, die capacity 
of die ordinary loom is restricted only to simple designs. Secondly, die 
motion required to be imparted to die heald by means of a treadle (die 
'shedding motion') being operated by die 'movement' of die legs in-
side die pit is less frequent in Jacquard compared to dial in an ordinary 
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loom, which certainly reduces the labour-time of the weaver. There are 
10-12 treadles in an ordinary loom used for developing designs on sarees 
whereas in the 'Mirjapur - Jaccjuard' it is only one or at the most two 
treadles that produce the same or even finer designs. Thirdly, Jacquard 
loom minimizes costs on account of loom-setting(warping) since a par-
ticular type of fabric is produced in relatively larger volumes. An ordi-
nary loom, on the other hand, remains inoperative for a couple of days 
in-between the completion of a 'batch' and the beginning of weaving 
of the next 'batch'. Quite often the Jacquard loom is set with such a 
volume of warp that the weaver would be able to make a continuous 
operation for about six months. This is a great advantage, at least, so 
far as the utilization of the family labour is concerned since 'continu-
ous' operation for a considerable period of time renders 'economics' in 
this respect, in various ways. 
However, the diffusion of the Jacquard loom is very slow since, 
with most ordinary materials only, a locally crafted loom (of 100 hooks) 
costs about Rs.7,000, in Mirjapur. Moreover, there are other additional 
initial costs like that for punch cards, etc. These together makes initial 
investment almost prohibitive to the common weavers. Extreme pov-
erty leaves little scope for self financing/'internal financing' by the 
artisans. And, creditand insuranc . needs are found to be crucial. Still 
the initiative shown,;by the 'pioneer' in Mirjapur has not dampened. 
An younger weaver has recently crafted a 300 - hook Jacquard loom. 
There are altogether three Jacquard looms in Mirjapur. 
Of the three hundred and odd weavers in Mirjapur, about two hun-
dred are engaged in weaving directly under the fifteen putter-out silk 
merchants or mahajans. The mahajans, for any particular fabric, often 
put out yarn in much less quantity as compared to the societies, and 
thereby impart a particular texture to fabrics (Table 1). Besides, the 
quality of yarn, particularly the weft, supplied by the mahajans quite 
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often is inferior to that of the Society. The silk merchants, in general, 
thus have a competitive edge over similar kinds of Society's products, 
in the undiscriminating market where the buyers are not well informed 
(Table 2). 
Table 1 
Mirjapur: the average amount of yarn being put out to weavers, for a 
single piece of particular fabric, by the Society and the silk 
merchants, respectively 
Variety of Total amount ' Warp yarn Weft yarn 
sarees of yarn (gms.) (nms.) (gms.) 
Society Mahajan Society Mahajan Society Mahujan 
Design satin - 530 375 230 175 300 200 
Karial 600 525 250 225 350 300 
Jamdani 500 450 200 300 150 300 
Plain satin 500 325 200 300 150 175 
Inchee saree - - 300 - 125 - 175 
College Par - - 285 - 110 - 175 
Funki saree 500 320 200 140 300 180 
Check anchal - 600 525 250 225 350 300 
Baluchari 600 575 250 250 350 325 
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Table 2 
Mirjapur : a comparison of the cost of production of various fabrics 
under the Society and the mahajan, respectively 
Silk fabric Cost of production n*c.) 
(saree) Societv Mahajan 
Design satin 920 520 
Karial 1300 690 
Jamdani 980 600 
Plain satin (Garad) 640 330 
Inchee 530 190 
College Paar 550 290 
Funki saree 650 330 
Check anchal 960 ' 620 
Baluchari 1140 800 
Notes: 
1) The cost of production includes (i) value of yarn, (ii) cost of 
bleaching and colouring (Mahajans do not pay for these over 
and above the wages), (iii) depreciation cost at the rate of Rs.40 
per saree for the Jacquard loom only, as paid by both the Society 
and mahajan. 
2) In calculating the value of yarn we have considered only one 
'set' of prices for warp and weft, for both the Society and the 
mahajan's products, as prevailed, on an average, in July 1993, in 
Mirjapur. 
3) The 'figures' in the Table are 'average' values only. Costs vary 
according to the texture of the fabric. 
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The variation in the cost of production between die two types of 
organizations is largely explained, as staled earlier, by die amount of 
yarn used per saree. The 'price gap' would enlarge furdier if die varia-
tion in die quality of yarn diat are being used by diem was taken into 
consideration. Moreover, die silk merchants reduce die quantity of 
yam per fabric as soon as die yam price goes up and dius manipulate 
the costs of production of the relatively higher price-elastic fabrics. 
Besides, the wages paid by the silk merchants are also comparatively 
low while die Society pays, say, Rs.400 for a piece of Jamdani, and 
Rs.406 for a Karial the silk merchants pay Rs.225-300 and Rs.273, 
respectively (Table 3). Moreover, the Society reimburses the costs in-
curred by die weaver on bleaching and colouring materials which die 
mahajan does not. The latter also enjoys an additional advantage of 
flexible wages unlike the Society whose wage rates are fixed by die 
apex body. The mahajan usually does not increase wages when the 
market prices of silk fabrics increase but a rising cot of yam is gener-
ally being counterbalanced by a reduction in die wage rates. The con-
ditions of the weavers 'tied' to the mahajans seem to be more vulner-
able as diey are, unlike the Society weavers, not covered under any 
social security scheme. 
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Table 3 
Mirjapur: the piece-rate wages paid by the Society and the mahajan, 
respectively, for the selected items 
(in Rs.) 








Design satin 300 47 200-275 
Karial 406 47 273 
Jamdani 400 47 225-300 
Plain satin - 82-93 25 60-75 
Funki 90 25 70 
Check anchal 275 42 200 
Baluchari 400 52 300 
These notwithstanding the silk merchants dominate a sizeable part 
of the weaving sector. Out of the 40 weaver households selected at 
random, in Mirjapur (in July 1993), 24 households were found to be 
exclusively working with the silk merchants while only four house-
holds weaving exclusively for the societies. The distribution of the 40 
sample households according to the mode of operation is as follows : 
Mode of operation No. of weaver households 
Under the societies - 4 
Under the mahajans - 24 
Independent - 1 
Society plus Mahajan - 9 
Society plus Independent - 1 
Society plus.Mahajan 
plus Independent - 1 
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The mahajans by dint of their easier access to loanable funds play 
a crucial role in the livelihood of the weavers; provide consumption 
loans at free of interest to most of the weavers. Secondly, the mahajans 
put out warp in quantities which are required for 18-20 sarees, and weft 
yarn only for two-three sarees, at a time. The weaver finishes two-
three pieces of cloth, drops the same to the mahajan, and in return gets 
wages and weft for the next 'batch' of production. To the weavers, this 
is a labour-saving arrangement as it enables them to economize on 
labour particularly in the pre-weaving jobs like processing of yarn, and 
warping. This system adopted by the mahajans has, in fact, created a 
different kind of problem for the societies. To mainly manoeuvre the 
weavers, the societies also put out the amount of yarn that is required 
for 18-20 pieces of saree (or, nine to ten standard lengths of fabrics), at 
a time, to a single weaver in spite of the fact that due to resources 
crunch they could not provide adequate employment to all the mem-
bers. Thus elements of discrimination and discontent breed in the co-
operative form of organization while the mahajans strengthen their socio-
economic position. The reason for disintegration closely follows to 
what Hardin (1968) has argued as 'tragedy of the commons'. Accord-
ing to Hardin, each individual has the incentive, in the case of com-
monly owned resources, to overuse the resources, regardless of what 
others do, thereby leading to the destruction of these resources. Here, 
the demand for the commonly owned resources (mainly, yarn) by each 
member-household is determined by the owned number of looms. And, 
in the short-run, the volume of working capital available to the Society 
is also given. However, the greater the number of looms owned by a 
particular household the quicker is the turnover as compared to others, 
and hence relative overuse of resources by this household. The cost 
burden of collective action thereby falls more disproportionately on 
the poorer households having less number of looms leading to inequali-
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ties of income. On the other hand, dissociation faces 'threats' of uncer-
tainties in the underdeveloped markets. The private putters-out, to the 
extent they actively participate in the production process, do provide 
an alternative organization in the present market conditions; and, the 
societies face threats of desertion. 
There are occasional attempts by the weavers also to break of the 
exploitative ties with the mahajans in the putting out system. Some-
times they are able to mobilize adequate working capital required mostly 
for yarn, or obtain those on-credi t f r o m the reelers. Yet the 
nonavailability of 'free' marketing channels brings them again under 
the yoke of the mahajans. Usually, the cloth prices do not fluctuate in 
accordance with the changes in the prices of yam. The price of silk 
fabric, when sold to the mahajan by the independent weaver, usually 
increase at a lower rate than that of the yam. By contrast, the decrease 
in the former as compared to the dwindling yam price, has always been 
proportionately larger. This makes independent weaving quite risky 
and uncertain. 
We have tried to estimate the monthly wage income per loom (Table 
4) on the basis of the capacity of a weaver and the full-capacity supply 
of yarn by the putter-out. It reveals the significant variation in income 
between the two groups of weavers. The disparity is even larger, since 
the costs incurred by the weaver on bleaching and colouring materials 
are not reimbursed by the mahajans. Further, the comparison of the 
wage costs as a proportion of the retail prices of the outputs of the 
society and the mahajan, respectively, may show the comparative pat-
tern of labour utilization. While the wage cost remain fixed the retail 
price of any particular fabric varies widely depending on the texture or 
designs (or both) of the fabric. This makes the calculation of the ratios 
on the basis of an average price tentative yet a fair approximation of 
the phenomenon. Table 5 shows that wage cost as a proportion of the 
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retail price is consistently higher for the Society than the mahajan, for 
any type of fabric. 
Table 4 
Mirjapur : monthly wage income per loom, under the Society and 
the mahajan 
Silk fabric Production Monthly wage income2 (Rs.) 
(saree) per month1 Under Society Under Mahajan 
(no.of pieces) 
Design satin 6 1800 1260 
Karial 3.5 1421 956 
Jamdani 4 1600 1080 
Plain satin 7 574 455 
Inchee paar 7 490 364 
College paar 10 750 700 
Funki 7 630 490 
Check anchal 5 1375 1000 
Baluchari 
(cheaper variety) 3 1200 900 
Jacquard 3 1800 1500 
Notes'. 1) The figures represent the working to capacity' of a weaver 
provided there is a continuous supply of yarn. 
2) Excluding the payments made for the bleaching and 
colouring costs. Moreover, this is only an approxima-
tion and directly proportional to the supply of yarn by 
the putter-out. 
From the weavers' point of view, however, the 'share of wages in 
the retail value of the fabric' has little significance since the labour-
time required for weaving of the different textures of fabric produced, 
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there, does not vary to the extent that would have explained the differ-
ences in the actual wages paid by the society and the mahajan, respec-
tively. Thus the conditions of living of those weavers exclusively work-
ing for the mahajan get worse as compared to the society-weavers. 
This further aggravates due to the fact that the mahajan often cut back 
production when the price of yarn goes up, resulting in reduced aggre-
gate wage-income of the weavers. 
Table 5 
Mirjapur: wage cost, and the cost of yarn as a proportion of the 
retail price of the fabric of the Society and the mahajan, 
respectively 
Silk fabric Wage costVRetail price(%) Cost of yarn/ Retail price(%) 
Society Mahajan Society Mahajan 
SAREE: 
Design satin 28.6 19.1 41.1 28.2 
Karial 32.9 18.8 40.4 29.0 
Jamdani 34.6 24.5 35.8 30.0 
Plain satin 10.2 8.1 45.2 33.4 
Inchee paar 12.7 9.4 51.0 24.9 
College paar 11.9 11.7 47.8 36.5 
Funki 10.5 9.7 43.0 35.6 
Check anchal 26.2 16.0 46.2 33.6 
Jacquard 43.2 32.7 35.0 28.1 
Baluchari 31.3 21.9 35.9 29.8 
Notes : 1) This includes, to the mahajan, the wages paid, and the 
of depreciation for the .lacquard loom. To the Society, on 
the other hand, this includes the costs of colouring and 
bleaching, depreciation of the Jacquard loom, wages, and 
the A.W.F. @8% and ex-gratia @ 10% (on the wages paid). 
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The product-mix is also being determined by the putter- out, most 
likely in response to demand conditions. If the weaver was allowed to 
decide on its own he would have produced only the Design satin, or 
else Jamdani sarees in order to maximize his income (cf. Table 4). But 
for the equilibrating agencies like the Society, the silk merchants the 
income per loom is much less in Mirjapur than would otherwise have 
been as apparent from Table 4. Our survey on the monthly income 
from weaving, as reproduced in Table 6, shows that 19 out of the 40 
households owned only one loom and their income did not exceed 
Rs. 1,500 per month. The state of affairs was not much better for those 
Table 6 
Mirjapur: the d i s t r i b u t i o n of the 40 weaver h o u s e h o l d s 
(sample) according to monthly wage-income, and the 
number of owned looms 
Monthly Distribution of households according to the 
wage-income number of looms owned 
(Rs.) One Two Three Four 
Up to 500 2 _ -
500-800 7 2 - -
800-1100 6 1 - -
1100-1500 4 4 - -
1500-2000 - 3 2 -
2000-2500 - - 2 -
2500-3000 - - 3 
3000-3500 - - 1 1 
3500-4000 - 1 1 
TOTAL: 19 10 6 5 
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who owned two looms. The low income with more than one loom is 
mostly explained by the fact that the other loom (looms) is(are) not 
being operated simultaneously. It is rather kept 'ready' to start pro-, 
duction of the new batch in quick succession. Moreover, higher in-
come with more than one loom has to be discounted in case the addi-
tional loom (or looms) is(are) operated by hired weaver(s). The aver-
age family size of these 40 households is found to be six. Thus, the per 
capita income of an average weaver seems to be hovering around the 
'poverty line'9. 
Table 7 
Mirjapur : the distribution of the 40 (sample) households accord-
ing to the number of hours spent daily for weaving 
I nhoiir hours Number of weaver 
Up to 7 
7 - 8 
8 - 9 





In fact, the actual earning of wages from the putters-out is even 
less than that shown in Table 6. The wage income per head per day of 
about nine hours of intensive labour (Table 7) being as low as Rs.15-
20, the practice of 'saving' a part of the total yarn supplied by the 
putter-out for a specific volume of fabrics, has become a common phe-
nomenon. And the putters-out know about it. They supply yarn by 
weight and take back the fabric whose weight must be equal to the 
weight of the yarn supplied less the stipulated rate of discount allow-
33 
ing for the losses due to processing of warp yarn, mainly. Actually, the 
loss of weight in the processing, mainly deguming, bleaching, and pol-
ishing of the thread is made up, by the weaver, with the starch (used as 
'filler'). The amount of warp thus 'saved', very little of course, is then 
combined with the purchased weft to produce fabric that yields addi-
tional income. Tentatively, if a weaver produce four Jamdani sarees 
with the yarn supplied by the putter-out, in a month, he could easily 
save such an amount of warp that is adequate for an additional Jamdani. 
Incomes from the latter are added to the weaver's actual wage income 
and shown in Table 6. This practice is, however, a common phei om-
enon in all the weaving centres where the putting-out system is in vogue. 
The survival of this industrial outwork, however, crucially depends 
on that part of the labour being spent by other members of the weaver 
family, mostly the women (except in warping) which remains unpaid. 
The pre-weaving processing, such as winding, deguming, bleaching, 
warping, shedding and, if necessary, colouring, takes about 32-48 hours 
per piece of cloth, depending upon the 'variety'. While, for instance, 
Karial or Jamdani requires about 45 hours, the Baluchari about 48 hours, 
the processing of yarn for a piece of plain satin or Funki saree takes 
about 32 hours. And, on an average, the subordinate members spend 
about five hours in a day on this work. Generally, the self-employed 
female members begin the work after lunch and continue till dusk. 
And this informal intra-familial division of labour has got the formal 
approval of the system of production. The violation of the 'rules', like 
say the subordinate members accept paid employment elsewhere, would 
only disrupt the household's target of production. 
The resource crunch of the societies in relation to the large num-
ber of artisans, provisions of yarn for whom have to be made in suffi-
cient quantities so that they are employed for a certain minimum num-
ber of man-days, in a month, and, the silk-merchants' 'spirit' for im-
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mediate profit gains, in general, have resulted in the production of low 
valued fabrics in ever larger quantities. The weaving of a Karial re-
quires about 78 man-hours, a Jamdani requires about 70 man-hours of 
labour whereas only 36 man-hours roughly would be enough to pro-
duce one Plain satin, or a Funki saree. Thus the production of low 
valued articles provide relatively quick returns on the limited resources 
put into circulation. Of the 40 weaver households (out of a population 
of about 300 weavers), in Mirjapur, it is found that only 18 weavers are 
particularly engaged in high valued materials like Karial, Jamdani, or 
Baluchari (its quality though inferior to Bishnupur's). Only two weav-
ers are found to be engaged exclusively in the weaving of Karial while 
three are in Jamdani (Table 8), and none in Baluchari. Among the 18 
weavers, most are found to be producing various 'mix' of the high, 
medium, and the low valued fabrics like plain satin, or Funki saree. etc. 
Since the latter type of fabrics is not yet standardized there remains 
enough scope for manipulation of the texture and thus tuning costs on 
yarn. This is usually done in two ways, by varying, (a) the number of 
warp threads, and (b) the quality of either warp or weft, or both. All 
these add up to nothing but a degeneration in the texture of cloth, as 
such and which is very likely to be counter-productive. 
Table 9 shows that the average (paid) labour time required for 
weaving of a particular fabric is not directly proportional to the cost-
price ratio. Jamdani, for instance, requires about double the amount of 
labour for an Inchee saree yet the cost of production of Jamdani consti-
tutes 65.6 per cent of the retail value as compared to 62.2 per cent for 
the Inchee saree. produced by the Society. The cost-price ratio shows 
(Table 9) that the Funki saree weaving is most profitable to the Society 
what the Inchee saree is to the mahajan. But since the profitability is 
estimated on the working capital only, this must take into account the 
period during which the capital remain 'blocked' . This allows us to 
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Table 8 
Mirjapur : the trend of weaving of high, medium and low valued 
sarees 
Variety of silk saree 
1. Karial plus others (but not Jamdani 
or Baluchari) 
of which, only Karial 
2. Jamdani plus others (but not Karial 
or Baluchari) 
of which, only Jamdani 
3. Karial plus Jamdani plus others (but 
not Baluchari) 
4. Baluchari plus others (but not 
Karial or Jamdani) 
5. Baluchari plus Karial/Jamdani 
plus others 
6. Design satin, only 
7. Design satin plus others 
8. Design satin plus others 
(ex. Karial, Jamdani, Baluchari) 













Mirjapur: labour-hours required, the cost-price ratio, and the 
surplus generated per hour of weaving of selected fabrics 
Silk saree Average labour Cost of production2 Retail value less 
-hours required as percentage of the CosLs/Labour-hours 
for weaving per Retail value (RsTlir.) 
piece1 
Society Mahajan i Society Society M a h a j a n 
[a] [b] 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Design satin 46 65.9 47.3 10.39 9.22 12.61 
Karial 78 68.8 47.8 6.41 5.47 9.70 
Jamdani 70 65.6 54.5 7.37 6.34 7.14 
Plain satin 36 54.2 41.5 15.11 14.70 13.00 
Inchee 35 62.2 34.4 9.17 8.81 10.31 
College paar 27 58.3 48.2 14.67 14.17 11.52 
Funki 36 52.2 45.2 16.61 16.16 11.02 
Check aanchal 54 68.9 49.6 8.07 7.16 11.67 
Jacquard 99 72.4 60.8 5.16 4.07 6.52 
Baluchari 101 63.3 51.7 6.54 5.83 7.40 
Notes: 1. Unpaid labour hours for winding, deguming, bleaching, 
colouring, and warping have not been considered in 
column(2). 
2. This includes: costs of yarn, bleaching and colouring 
materials, depreciation for Jacquard loom,and wages. 
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3. The figures in column(5), i.e. Society [a] do not include 
the costs incurred by the Society on account of A.W.F. 
(at the rate of 8%), and ex-gratia (at the rate of 10%) on 
the wages. However, the figures in column(6), i.e. Soci-
ety [b], have been calculated after adding 18% to the 
payments of wages. 
4. The 'ratio', and the values shown in the Table should be 
treated as indicative since we have considered only the 
average prices of the yarn as well as final products. 
estimate the value of surplus (value less the costs of production) gener-
ated per hour of paid labour in weaving, both for the Society and 
mahajan. as the relevant index of profitability. 
Table 9 (columns 5, 6 and 7) shows the variation in the rate of 
surplus according to the type of fabrics and, the production organiza-
tions. It is found that although Karial, Jamdani, Jacquard saree, or 
Baluchari requires longer labour-hours the rate of surplus is much lower 
compared to fabr ics which require less hours of labour. The 
disproportionality, in general, between the 'labour content' of a fabric 
and the rate of surplus, irrespective of the organizations of production, 
is largely determined by the characteristics of the output-market. This 
has been persisting for a considerable period of time. Thus, the market 
does not provide much inducement to reallocate resources towards pro-
duction of 'superior' fabrics. 
Further, the rate of surplus being appropriated by the Society is 
consistently higher, for all the fabrics, than that by the mahajan. The 
weaving of the Funki saree yields a surplus of Rs. 16.61 per hour of 
labour, to the Society; and, which is highest among all the fabrics being 
produced under this organization. By comparison, the highest rate of 
surplus that accrues to the mahajan from the weaving of Design satin is 
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only Rs. 12.61 (Table 9, column 7). The unique contribution towards 
A.W.F. as well as ex-gratia hardly makes any change in the Society's 
position is this regard (Table 9, columns 5 and 6). 
The utilization of the available capital, however, by the Society or 
the mahajan, has no direct correspondence with the relative profitabil-
ity of the different types of fabrics. The societies concentrate in the 
production of sarees, such as Funki, Check aanchal and, to a limited 
extent, Karial. The weavers under the mahajans, on the other hand, are 
found to be heavily engaged in the weaving of Jamdani, Design satin, 
and Plain satin. Of the 24 weavers, those who were working exclu-
sively under the mahajans, seven used to produce Jamdani, while de-
sign satin and plain satin are found to have engaged six and eight weav-
ers, respectively. In other words, the range of products of the mahajan's 
is relatively wide and includes sarees such as Baluchari, Jacquard sarees, 
and a few Karial. 
The societies with their limited volumes of working capital in re-
lation to the numbers of artisans under their fold rather prefer to have 
more frequent circulation of the available capital than on concentrat-
ing in the longer 'gestation' areas. The relatively skilled group of weav-
ers those who are in search of stable employment for a longer period of 
time has naturally mobilized around the mahajans, even if the latter do 
not provide them with any social security measure, let alone the com-
paratively low wage-rate. Some of the weavers distribute their labour-
time on both of the mahajan and the Society's job, depending on the 
intensity of labour required for the particular job. For instance, a weaver 
family may be found to have been weaving Jamdani for the mahajan 
and less time-consuming Funki, or plain satin, etc., for the Society. Of 
the three weaver families, who together owned four Jacquard looms, 
two attain both the societies and the mahajans, and the third one the 
mahajans, only. Thus, the 'regrouping' of the weavers in Mirjapur is 
39 
not a direct consequence of the differentia] wage-rates. Rather, it is the 
objective of maximizing gross (annual/monthly) income that largely 
explain the 'inter-secoral' mobility of the weavers. 
The feet that about 200 out of the 300 weaver households in Mirjapur 
are employed directly under the mahajans and working at a compara-
tively low wage yet they have no effective union against their masters 
does indicate the weak bargaining position of these weavers. They have 
become only a marginal element in the productive process and are li-
able to be often unemployed or underemployed, and thus they could do 
little to inconvenience their masters by withholding their labour. Be-
cause of their habitual poverty they feel little temptation to migrate, 
also. Almost all of the 40 weavers who happened to be landless as"well' 
replied that they are unable to do any other productive work. And the 
relatively elders among them said that at that age it is very difficult to 
adapt to a 'new' work-conditions. The additional advantage in the 
handloom weaving industry is that it served largely to occupy p a r t of 
the family for part of the time; father, mother and children could all 
share in the work which would be carried on in the home itself. The 
traditionally of the family occupation may explain the sociological rea-
sons behind the 'immobility' of this labour force particularly when al-
most all of them consider weaving as unremunerative. But the fact that 
despite having complete information on the conditions of work in this 
sector there is still new additions to the existing labour force. The cu-
mulative total age-distribution of the 40 weaver households in this sec-
tor shows that two families had installed handlooms only about two 
years ago, four during last seven years, 14 during last 15 years, 23 dur-
ing last 20 years, 30 during last 30 years, and 37 during last 40 years 
while the remaining 3 families are found to be engaged in the activity 
for more than 60 years. Of course, the new entrants into this sector are 
weavers by caste. But since they are at their 20's, and most of them are 
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educated (at least high school-passed), and since their family had dis-
continued the job long before, there was necessarily no 'pull ' forces for 
them to re-enter into this business unless some other economic com-
pulsions were there. 
Bishnupur, on the other hand, provides a different picture of the 
sector. As stated earlier, Bishnupur has specialized in such kinds of 
fabric that have been experiencing a steadily growing market during 
last couple of years. And, increasingly the ' t ied' weavers are opting 
for independent operation unless otherwise their bondage in some forms 
or other obstructs the 'movement ' . The Silk Khadi Seva Mandal (the 
largest among the societies in Bishnupur) used to produce about 1500-
2000 Baluchari sarees per annum, or, in other words, 120-150 sarees 
per month. Even such a big organization has been losing its recruits of 
weavers. While the number of looms used for Baluchari and operated 
under the direct control of the particular society was 48-50 in 1991 it 
decreased to 35, within two years, in 1993. The participation of the 
silk merchants in production, on the other hand, is virtually limited, 
unlike in Mirjapur, to trading in finished products. However, there are 
a few master-weavers owning a number of looms who operate those 
with journeymen (Banidaar) and apprentices. But the basic difference 
between master-weaver and the mahajan is that the former depend over-
whelmingly on the mahajans for marketing of their produce, and that 
too on-credit. 
These master-weavers, however, have a few similarities also with 
the method of operation of the mahajans in Mirjapur. They have adopted 
certain cost reducing technique to make their outputs price competi-
tive. As stated earlier, mainly three varieties of Baiuchari sarees are 
produced in Bishnupur, viz., single-coloured, bi-coloured, and bi-
coloured with gold or silver threads. For the latter variety, the societies 
are supposed to use only that quality of gold/silver threads the prices of 
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which are not less than Rs.8,000 per kilogram while the master-weav-
ers usually put in threads that cost about Rs.2,200, thereby reducing the 
costs by about four times on this item alone. Similarly, a comparison of 
the wage-rates of the society with that paid by the master-weavers and, 
with the gross income of the independent weavers, reveals another source 
of price-competitiveness of the master-weaver (Table 10). For a single-
coloured Baluchari, the society pays Rs.575 as wages and an indepen-
dent weaver earns about Rs.600. By comparison, a master-weaver pays 
only Rs.450 for the said variety. Further, the contributions made by the 
societies towards A.WF. and ex-gratia if are added to the wages it would 
appear that working under them was more remunerative than indepen-
dent operation. 
The actual income of the journeyman, on the other hand, is even 
less than that shown in Table 10, since a part of the piece-rate wage 
being paid by the master-weaver is shared by an apprentice. Moreover, 
quite often two journeymen jointly produce one Baluchari. They have 
their indigenous method of sharing the wage-bill paid by the master-
weaver. The weaving of a Baluchari saree could be separated into vari-
ous 'segments' according to the skill and intensity of labour required, 
following which the wage is shared on the basis of 'who does what'. 
For instance, 250-275 cards together constitute one bunch (hala). Weav-
ing through these cards would add up 3.5-4 inches to the saree. And, 
the wage-bill is shared in such a way that, say, weaving of one hala of 
aanchal (border) carries approximately Rs.4. However, this system of 
wage-sharing is strictly informal and varies from units to unit. The 
complexity appears to be more in sharing the bonus. After protracted 
negotiations the journeymen have been able, since 1989, to earn the 
entitlement to 'production bonus' annually at the rate of 8.33 per cent. 
The productivity of both the loom and the labour in Bishnupur is 
higher than that in Mirjapur since, as it is found, the labour-time re-
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quired to produce one piece of single-coloured Baluchari in the former 
is more than half of that in the latter (sf. Tables 9 and 10) in spite of the 
fact that only 'inferior' variety is produced in Mirjapur. In fact, the 
distinguishing characteristic of Baluchari is that the labour-time re-
quired for pre-weaving processing is proportionately more than weav-
ing. Here again, the product of Bishnupur could be differentiated from 
that of Mirjapur on the basis of the labour-hours spent on the pre-weav-
ing processing. In Bishnupur, one single-coloured Baluchari saree re-
quires, on an average, 115 hours of labour for processing the yarn itself 
and, winding, warping, denting, healding, drafting, etc. By compari-
son, the aggregate labour spent on the same does not exceed 50 hours,in 
Mirjapur. Here, the time required for fixing a 'design' on punch-cards 
to the Jacquard loom has not been included since the same design is 
repeatedly used in a large number of sarees. 
If a Baluchari weaver employ hired worker(s) for pre-weaving pro-
cessing, a large part of which is otherwise done by unpaid family mem-
bers mainly women, that would entail an additional expenditure of not 
less than Rs.150 per saree, irrespective of the variety. The job of pre-
weaving processing, thus, if were paid for by the weaver himself, the 
piece-rate wage of the Society reduces to a level which is almost iden-
tical to that of the master-weaver. And, by this yard-stick, independent 
weaving turns out to be comparatively more remunerative. However, 
as stated earlier, for a single-coloured design, the total initial invest-
ment required is about Rs.5,500 apart from the costs of yarn and other 
complementary expenses. These together acts as a barrier to becoming 
independent for many of the 'tied' weavers. 
In fact, the steady demand for Baluchari during last couple of years 
has enabled some of the 'ded' weavers to accumulate the required 'funds' 
to venture into independent operation. A Baluchari weaver is normally 
able to produce six single-coloured, or four bi-coloured, or three bi-
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coloured with silver/gold threads sarees, per month. And the corre-
sponding wage-incomes, under the society, come to around Rs.3,450, 
Rs.3.800, and Rs.3.600. respectively, while the same under the master-
weaver are Rs.2,700, Rs.3.200. and Rs.3,000. Thus, the weavers' con-
ditions of iiving in Bishnupur are remarkably different from that in 
Mirjapur. 
Table 10 
Bishnupur : the labour-requirement for pre-weaving processing and 
weaving, the wages paid by the societies as well as mas-
ter- weavers, and the income earned by the independent 
weavers from a single piece of fabric, as in November 
1993 
Baluchri Labour-hours Labour-hours Piece-rate wagefRs.) Net income' 











with gold or 
silver threads 















1200 . 1000 1200 
Excluding the A.W.F. and ex-gratia payments. 
Excluding the payment of bonus at the rate of 8.33% 
on wages. 
According to the statements made by a number of in-
dependent weavers. This is nett of current expenses, 
only, and requires to be discounted for the cost of 
invested capital. 
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Baluchari also enables the investors to garner relatively large mar-
gins of 'profit ' . It is evident from Table 11 that a piece of bi-coloured 
saree with silver/gold threads yields as high as Rs.2,830 to the society 
having its own retail outlets while a single-coloured saree does about 
Rs.870, net of aggregate costs of production. Since the societies sale 
the produce through the Khadi 'chain' of retail shops, the calculation 
of the margin of profit is relatively easier than that for the master-
weavers. The latter usually take their outputs to the local silk mer-
chants and hence the retail price, for them, does not reflect the price 
actually fetched. In fact, the master-weaver earns a fraction only of 
what is shown in Table 11 (column 9) as remuneration for 'supervi-
sion'. This distinguishes a master-weaver in Bishnupur from the silk 
merchants in Mirjapur. So long the silk merchant charges only a 'rea-
sonable' commission for the service rendered in the form of marketing 
the produce the organization of production by master-weavers would 
effectively compete the societies. The comparatively low prices of the 
outputs of the master-weavers, or the independent weavers as com-
pared to the Society's even after allowing for a margin for the differ-
ences in quality, certainly is the competitive advantage of the group of 
non-Society manufacturers. But for the underdevelopment of certain 
institutions the 'advantage' fails to transform into 'gains' to the latter. 
However, the output market, as envisaged by many who are di-
rectly related to the sector, is perhaps approaching the demand-satura-
tion level unless the designs of the Baluchari are changed. The societ-
ies could take lead in developing and invest in 'new' designs. And, so 
long they fail to perform in this role the unequal distribution of gains 
among the major participants in the processes of production would hardly 
be considered as conducive to growth. There are ways of reducing 
costs of production substantially but they are beyond the financial ca-
pacity of the individual weavers. For instance, computer aided design 
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(CAD) would not only speed up die process of designing but would 
also greatly reduce die card-punching time. As the cards could easily 
be duplicated the entire costs of designing would be distributed among 
the weavers. Of course, die CAD would directly reduce employment 
in designing but, in die aggregate, die net employment would increase 
by engaging the looms more effectively and in greater numbers. 
At present, die looms are fully utilized. On every loom, double 
shift work is continuing for about last five years. Each weaver is fully 
employed. Even die journeymen and hired workers engaged in other 
pre-weaving processing work are gainfully employed. Each loom runs 
for about 16 hours a day. While two odier traditional handicrafts, namely, 
brass and bell metal, and conch-shell are at the verge of collapse die 
Baluchari has turned out to be the main artisanal occupation in 
Bishnupur. The readily available labour-force, at least for the lowly 
paid job10 of pre-weaving processing, has automatically rendered cost 
efficiency to die industry, without any 'initiative' whatsoever on die 
part of the entrepreneurs. 
The revival of an 'old' craft and its ready demand from a limited 
segment of die consumers might not have immediately induced die 
mahajans in Bishnupur to take 'risks' of direct participation in die pro-
duction. But dieir non-participation in the manufacturing of more or 
less standardized and low valued plain silk-clodi in Chawk-Islampur 
draws particular attention. There arc about 2,300 looms in Chawk-
Isl ampur area. Excepting a limited few, most of die weavers are de-
pendent upon die 32 societies active in die area. Of these, only five are 
cooperatives and. die rest are charitable societies. The cooperative 
societies are relatively large in size; die smallest one is having a mem-
bership strength of 118 weavers while the largest one having 403 weav-
ers. The charitable societies are relatively small with the number of 
artisans v;irying from 15 to 25. 
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V Y 
Cloth of both reeled and the spun silk yarn, exclusively, and of 
various mix of the two types of yarn are produced in Chawk-lslampur. 
There is significant concentration of spinners, mostly women, in the 
area who spin yarn from dressed waste silk and pierced cocoons, manu-
ally with takli (spindle). This has largely determined the volume of 
mixed silk fabrics produced in Chawk-lslampur. The use of (mulberry) 
reeled silk yarn, and the spun silk yarn from pierced tasar cocoons 
(called Katia yarn) and mulberry cocoons (called Matka yarn), from 
tasar cocoon peduncles (called Baikal yarn), and from reeling silkwaste 
(called Jhoot yarn), in varying combinations, brings out wide varieties 
of fabrics. Even cotton Muslin as weft is combined with mulberry 
reeled silk (as warp) to produce silk muslin, which is mostly used as 
shirtings. However, to note, although the demand for these otherwise 
low valued materials is growing in foreign markets the impact is hardly 
felt locally at least so far as the prices are concerned. The weak trade-
growth linkage may be partly explained by the fact that the local soci-
eties are not engaged in direct exports.to foreign countries. 
Out of the 2,300 looms in Chawk-lslampur, at the most 1,000 looms 
are engaged in the weaving of reeled silk yarn while the rest are in spun 
silk fabric production. The importance of Chawk-lslampur in the silk 
production in West Bengal could be gauged from the fact that about 
3,000 kilograms of reeled silk, and 15,000 kgs. of spun silk are re-
quired per month, in this area alone. This amounts to about 0.216 
million kilograms of yarn per annum which is about one-fourth of the 
aggregate raw silk production in the state11 (cf. GOWB, 1992-93 : Table 
5.6). Thus, this high concentration of weaving of relatively cheaper 
silk goods typically represents the overall situation of silk weaving in 
the state. 
The societies in Chawk-Islampur usually put out warp yarn to the 
weavers in quantities which would be adequate for six to eight stan-
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dard lengths of fabrics of, at the minimum, 11 m. x 0.91 m. in size per 
piece,as compared to nine to ten pieces in Mirjapur. The weft yarn 
however, are supplied only for two lengths, at a time. In case, the 
Society could not supply hanked nett silk yarn as warp to the weaver it 
allows a discount of 60 gms. per kilogram of yarn supplied, as wastage 
in processing. In fact, the 'wastage' is much less. Moreover, although 
reeled silk yarn could not be 'starched' it has become a common prac-
tice to spray 70-75 gms. of starch on a standard length of fabric, during 
weaving. The 'set aside' warp yarn are combined with the purchased 
wept from the market to produce cloth that yields additional incomes 
to the weaver. 
It is found that, in 1992-93, the monthly income of a weaver asso-
ciated with a charitable society was about Rs.470 (see Annual Report, 
1992-93, Chandrakanto Lalit Mohan Resham Khadi Samity, Chawk-
Islampur). The wages to be paid by the societies for various jobs have, 
been recently revised and made effective from 1st April 1993 (though 
was supposed to be effective from 1st December 1992). And the in-
come of the weaver is supposed to have increased proportionately. Given 
the low per capita income in the putting out system, the supplementary 
incomes from 'saved' yarn merely provide subsistence to the weaver 
household, almost all the members of which take part in the processes 
of production at different stages. 
The weaving of spun silk yarn, on the other hand, yields higher 
incomes in two different ways. First, the spun yarn, especially Matka, 
weaving is more labour intensive as compared to reeled silk weaving 
and, consequently, the wages are also higher. Secondly, the definite 
need to apply starch for sizing of the yarn leaves much elbowroom for 
yarn 'saving'. Reallocation of resources from reeled yarn to the spun 
yarn weaving in a significant manner is, however, restricted by the 
conditions of supply of the spun yarn. The supply of the latter particu-
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larly the Matka is limited as compared to reeled yarn. The societies 
determine the volume of different types of fabric to be produced ac-
cording to the market conditions. It is also the discretion of the societ-
ies: whom (weaver) to assign which job. These together appears to 
have resulted in 'tensions' among the weavers vis-a-vis the societies. 
Table 12 shows the maximum pieces of a particular fabric that a 
weaver is able to produce in a month provided there is uninterrupted 
supply of yarn, and the corresponding gross wage-income. We will 
come to the issue of difference between gross and net income later. 
Since most of the weavers, here, are working under the societies we 
have considered only the Society's stipulated rates of wages. It is evi-
dent from the Table that income varies widely depending upon the type 
of fabric produced in the loom. Interestingly, the weaving of spun silk, 
or a blend of reeled and spun silk yarn often pays more than 'pure' 
reeled silk. It concerns since spun silk yarn are much cheaper than 
reeled silk. In general, the piece-rate wage for weaving of spun silk 
fabric, or blended fabric is greater than that for reeled silk fabric. As a 
result a weaver would be able to earn about Rs.100 more per month by 
producing, say, Matka dhotis as compared to silk dhotis. It seems that 
the spun silk weaving would soon replace reeled silk weaving in Chawk-
lslampur, since the former is much more remunerative to the weaver. 
In fact, some of the weavers in recent period have discontinued weav-
ing under one of the well-known societies12, as the latter could not 
supply to them spun silk yarn in adequate quantities, or anything at all. 
Monthly wage-income from spun silk weaving would be around 
Rs. 1,100 whereas, as reported in the annual report of the Chandraokanto 
Lalitmohon Resham Khadi Samity, 1992-93, the average per capita 
annual wage income of the spinners of matka, balkal, jhoot, katia, etc., 
during the year, was only Rs.953. No matter whether the spinners are 
part-timers or not, the phenomenon certainly reveals two important 
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53 
things. First, the supply of spun yarn is severely restricted by the tech-
nique of spinning. Secondly, the high demand of the yarn notwith-
standing the supply-inelasticity has not resulted in enhanced wage-
income, or increase in the price of the yarn, either. It was found during 
our survey in 1991 that the price of 'common' (40-45s)13 matka yarn at 
the local bazaars, viz., Islampur and Domkal, hovered around Rs.240-
250 per kg. The price-chart issued by the apex Khadi Samity, on the 
other hand, shows that the revised rate (as effective in the state from 
1st December 1992) per kilogram of matka yarn up to 60s. -- the cost 
at which the societies should produce -- is Rs.320-390, depending on 
the counts. Incidentally, a large number of spinners in the area are 
self-employed, and the societies are hardly engaged in spinning. The 
re-survey in the villages, such as Domkal Kuthi, Satbaria, in the Chawk-
lslampur area, of 34 spinner households during November-December 
1993, reveals that they had sold the common quality of yarn at the rate 
of Rs.220-250 per kg. in the local bazaars. The medium-fine variety of 
50-55s. fetches Rs.260-300. And, the best of their produce (i.e. 60s. or 
so) were sold at Rs.330-350. Only four, out of the 34 spinners, were 
found to be spinning yarn of 60s. or so. 
As it appears the oligopsonist societies and their agents in Chawk-
lslampur collude and effectively keep the prices in the markets de-
pressed. The huge margin between the 'official' price and the local 
market price is a very 'attractive' source of income to the charitable 
societies, who are not supposed to distribute the profits, and also to the 
cooperative societies, to whom it accrues in the form of 'unaccounted 
income". Thus, there is little inducement, on the part of the society, to 
invest in spinning excepting that required for window-dressing. In 
fact, the 'official' price for finer yarn, say, of 60-100s„ varies from 
Rs.423 to Rs.577 and thus perhaps is not inimical to the adoption of 
improved technology in spinning. Since for obvious reasons the spin-
54 
ning of finer yarn of more than 50s generally requires skill of a high 
order in manually operated country takli the weaving of finer variety of 
spun silk fabric, in the state, is overwhelmingly dependent upon im-
ports of yarn from other states14. Count-wise the spun silk yarn of 
Chawk-Islampur are mostly 40-55s. While relatively fine yarn say, of 
55s., are used in plain-cloth, mainly for shirtings, the sarees or chadars 
are produced with 40-45s. 
Table 13 shows that the weaving of blended fabric is more profit-
able than that of either reeled silk or spun silk, exclusively. Measured 
in terms of the balance of the value less the costs as a ratio of labour-
hours required to produce the particular fabric, the profitability is found 
to be highest in the 'si lk-jhoot ' type of blended fabrics, followed by 
matka-silk, silk-matka and matka-jhoot mix (the former, in the blended 
fabric, is used as warp while the latter as weft), in that order (Table 13). 
While, say, the 'matka-silk ' cloth used as shirtings yields Rs.21.31 per 
hour of labour in weaving the finer quality of reeled silk shirtings fetches 
Rs.8.48, and the 'pure ' matka shirtings Rs.6.88. On the whole, apart 
from blended fabrics, 'pure ' matka is more profitable than reeled silk 
fabrics. The intensity of labour has little do with the relative profitabil-
ity of the particular fabric. As evident in Table 13 both the reeled silk 
shirtings and matka-silk mixed shirtings, of the same size, require 48 
hours of labour in weaving yet the latter turns out to be about 151 per 
cent more profitable than the former. Further, a reeled silk saree (of 
11 m.x 1.15m in size) requires about 40 labour-hours and yields Rs.5.52 
as 'surplus' per hour of labour whereas a piece of matka saree (5.03m x 
1.17m.) requiring only about 24 labour-hours yields almost the same. 
In fact, the aggregate cost of production as percentage of the retail 
price is found to be as high as 82-85 in the case of (reeled) silk saree as 
compared to 35.9 in matka-silk, 66.5 in silk-matka, 48.4 in silk-jhoot, 
and so on. 
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It may so happen that the variation in the hourly wage-rate (Table 
12) takes into account the volume of labour involved in the job of pre-
weaving processing. The wage per hour of weaving varies between 
Rs.2.25 and Rs.5.50 depending on the fabric produced. By contrast, 
the surplus generated per hour of weaving is not less than Rs.5.52 and 
goes up to Rs.21.66, excluding the unpaid labour in pre-weaving pro-
cessing (Table 13). Although the whole of the 'surplus' does not ac-
crue to the putter-out, the cost-price structure as fixed by the apex Khadi 
Samity has, in fact, ensured 'gains' to the putter-out in more certain 
terms than it is to the actual producers. 
The distribution of the 48 selected weaver households according 
to the number of owned looms, and the corresponding monthly wa«e-
income net of all expenditure, in Chawk-Islampur, shows that about 
80 per cent of them subsist on a monthly income of Rs.700 at the most, 
from weaving, irrespective of the number of looms owned (Table 14). 
Of the 48 households, seven have agricultural lands of not more than 
0.33 acre each, five have 0.66 to 1.33 acres. Only two of them have 
4.66 and 7 acres, respectively. And, for the rest, there is nothing as 
such to fall back upon. The expansion of the domestic unit by adding 
more number of looms to the existing 'stock' is by itself no guarantee 
for enhanced family-income. Seven households, for instance, owned 
more than one loom yet their monthly wage incomes did not exceed 
Rs.600 (Table 14); this amount of income was earned by some of the 
weavers even with a single loom on hand. Only those independents 
among the selected weavers who were able to mobilize adequate work-
ing capital are relatively better placed, in this respect. Otherwise the 
independent weavers could not be differentiated from the 'tied' weav-
ers, in any significant manner, so far as the wage incomes are con-
cerned. 
The main hindrance to vertical expansion of this industrial 'out-
58 
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work' is the availability of weaving-hands within the family. The hired 
worker has not turned out to be 'appropriate' substitute for various 
reasons. First, the supply of yarn from the Society is highly irregular 
The societies in Chawk-Islampur, as stated earlier, usually put out less 
amount of warp than that in Mirjapur. This entails frequent interrup-
tion in the continuity of we.wmg, and hence additional costs for the 
weaver, particularly on warping, shedding, healding, draftino etc 
According to the managers of the Societies, the available capital as a 
proportion of the numbers of artisans under them is inadequate Thus 
the irregularity of the occupation makes it difficult for the weavers to 
tmd ' f ree ' labour to employ whenever required; in weaving as well as 
the pre-weaving processing. This has, in particular, reduced the supply 
elastic.ty of output. Any sudden increase in market-demand, paradoxi-
cally, due to the restricted supply of labour, is responded by increased 
supply of finished materials only at a considerable time-la* 
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Table 14 
Chawk- l s lampur : d i s t r ibu t ion of the 48 ( s a m p l e ) w e a v e r 
households according to the number of owned 
looms and the corresponding monthly net wage 
income 
Monthly One Two Three Four Total 
wage loom looms looms looms 
income 
(Rs.) 




300 - 400 13 2 
400 - 500 6 2 
500 - 600 2 3 
o < 
600 - 700 - 6 
j f. 
700 - 800 - 2 1 
o 
800 - 900 - 1 1 
J 
o 
900- 1000 - 1 1 
fr 
o 
1000- 1100 1 „ 
L 
1 





1200- 1300 - 1 
Total: 26 18 3 1 
Secondly, the piece-rate wages paid by the Society are too low to 
be 'gainfully' shared with a Banidaar. This is particularly so as the 
costs incurred by the weaver for the pre-weaving processing jobs are 
not being pa.d by the putter-out. The average labour-hours required for 
pre-weaving processing of particular pieces of fabrics are shown in 
Table 15. In fact, in case the Society does not supply twisted and hanked 
nett sdk warp yarn the volume of unpaid labour increases further. The 
60 
imputed cost of ,he labour that remains unpaid is, however shown in 
.he same Table, and is based on ,he wage-ra,es in different p eparlto 
work had those been done by hired workers. „ is found that t e la 
as a proportion of the paid-wages is generally higher in reeled s„k 
weaving than in either spun silk or blended fabrics. On the whole the 
r ; r 17 ,o 46 per cem'dependin8 °n ^ * -
G ven this quite considerable volume of nondescript labour that are 
otherwise predominantly done by the family-members, a marginal in-
crease m the wage-rate for weaving would hardly induce a ,o,Ja, 
mas er-weaver to emp.oy Bandar. Consequently, the capacity to sup-
of fre determined by the size of the weaver-family and the amount 
of free labour-time available to each member of the family. This over-
I e c l o m y " b a S C d S e C ' ° r ° f P r 0 d U C , i ° " 'o-a economy in many respects has, however, failed to keep its mark on 
•he labour market as such. It is usually assumed that 'seasonality' makes 
primarily due to higher t r l a c t i o 
costs of labour. However, ,n Chawk-klampur, the occasional demand 
of hired workers and that too for a shorter period of time, particularly 
or the job of pre-weaving processing, has no, enhanced the waoe-rate 
or the same. In fact, i, i s f o u n d f r o m T a W e ] 5 ^ ^ 
a e is generally lower than Rs.2. Since the system of hirinS labour o„ 
adaily-basis hardly exist in the sector in ChawMslampur. and the piece-
rate wage predominates the labour market, the hourly waoe-rate as 
described above, reflects this industrial outwork m o r ^ L f c p * 
weav^n" d h 7 " 0 H e ' " k e " M i r j a P U f ' t h e ' 0 W l e V e ' * » » weaving did not dissuade the labour force from u n d e r t a k e this eco-
*>m,c activity i n Chawk-Islampur. „ i s o b s e r v e d , h a [ „ e w ^ 
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last fifteen years, The 48 selected weaver households together consti-
tutes a case in point. These households altogether owned 76 looms. Of 
these, 46 looms have been installed during last 20 years (Table 16). 
To conclude, the khadi societies together, more or less, dictate the 
prices of silk fabrics in the domestic market by dint of high market-
share. In fact, the price of khadi-fabrics generally could be considered 
as the 'ceiling'. Although the privately produced and/or marketed fab-
rics are not always strictly comparable to khadi the prices of the former 
Table 16 
Chawk-Islampur : age distribution of the (sample) looms 
Age of the loom(Year) Number of looms 
Up to 5 2 
5 - 1 0 12 
1 0 - 1 5 24 
1 5 - 2 0 8 
2 0 - 3 0 15 
3 0 - 4 0 13 
4 0 - 50 i 
5 0 - 60 1 
Total : 76 
are usually much lower than that of khadi. According to the khadi 
guideline, the prices are fixed on a cost-plus basis. The guideline al-
lows a 25 per cent mark-up on the prime cost16 to determine the 'total 
value', and added to it are insurance charges, and charges for bank 
finance17 at the rate of 0.5 and 1.5 per cent of the 'total value', respec-
tively, to determine the retail value. Incidentally, the sales tax was 
abolished in September 1991, and there is no excise duty, either. How-
64 
ever, as shown earlier quite often the market price of khadi is consider-
ably higher than the 'stipulated' price, and hence the retained income 
of the Society. The magnitude of difference between the two sets of 
price, however, does not vary as to whether the cloth is an exotic or a 
common variety. Usually it is assumed that the exotic variety would 
yield higher rate of profit due particularly to the premium for ' fancy' 
But, under conditions of free market situation very S 0 0 n the supply 
comes to term with the specific demand conditions and obliterate the 
excess profitability. Baluchari being an exotic fabric is supposed to 
yield the highest rate of return among all the fabrics produced in West 
Bengal. However, so far as the Society's rate of return from different 
produce is concerned it is rather the fabrics of reeled-spun mix as a 
group, that occupies the prime place and Baluchan comes next to that 
(cf. Tables 9, 11 and 13). Moreover, Mirjapur's products, in this re-
spect, would hardly be differentiated from the generally low-valued 
items of Chawk-Islampur. In fact, generally the more standardized 
varieties of silk fabrics are found to be relatively profitable to the putters-
out, particularly the societies. Even, the master-weaver organizing pro-
duction of Baluchari yields a lower rate of return than the mahajan who 
employs capital in the medium valued sarees in Mirjapur These to-
gether prominently show the kind of distortions that characterizes this 
industrial 'outwork'. 
6. Concluding Remarks 
The value (at current prices) of the silk produced by the societies 
m West Bengal increased from Rs.224.4 million in 1990-91 to 
Rs.229.lm. in 1991-92, and further by a big jump to Rs.260.5m. in 
1992-93 (KVIC, Eastern Zonal Certification Committee). Out of the 
265 societies in the state, only 18 are co-operatives (Table 17) and 
they together constituted 35-39 per cent of the annual output of fin-
65 
.shed silk of the societies, during 1990-93. In fact, the share of the 
.cooperative societies in the aggregate of societies' outputs declined 
from 38.6 per cent in 1991-92 to 35.9 per cent in 1992-93. The over-
whelming majority of the charitable societies in the state, in general, 
and in the three central silk producing districts, viz. Birbhum* Malda 
and Murshidabad, in particular, effectively determines the conditions 
of silk production. The bulk of the large amount of subsidies and 'soft ' 
loans provided to the societies by the government, through KVIC, have 
in fact gone to the charitable societies who performance-wise, in so 
many ways, are indistinguishable from the private silk merchants oper-
ating as putter-out. This certainly invokes a review of the government 
policies to promote silk weaving through the society form of organiza-
tion. 
The khadi programme, in order to effectively organize the poor 
hand loom weavers and protect them from the exploitative mechanism 
of an underdeveloped market institution has, in fact, proliferated an 
alternative institution which is not endowed with any visible dynamic 
element in it. Particularly, the non-governmental organizations (NGO), 
or in other words, the charitable societies organized by the rural elites 
reinforce almost the same conditions of production as that by the pri-
vate silk merchants. While the New Institutional Economics, and the 
international development agencies (see, for example, UNDP, 1993 
chapter 5) reassert the role of the people's organizations and NGOs in 
developing countries it remains unanswered, there: why such types of 
organizations even after a fairly long period of operation failed to en-
sure distributive justice to the perpetually wretched conditions of liv-
ing of the people concerned? 
The common understanding is that production costs are high when 
specialization and division of labour are limited. However, this does 
not explain the cost effectiveness of the households organization of 
66 
production, ,„ general, and in handloom weaving, in particular In a 
labour surplus economy, generally, the unpaid proportion of labour 
, S n ° t h i n S b u t ^elf-exploitation, congealed in the commodity 
produced is considerably high which renders the production line cost 
effective from the point of view of the market. Our exercise on me 
margin of difference between the cost of production and the market 
value of a cloth, in fact, may also show the margin by which the house-
hold organization is capable of absorbing external shocks However 
the capacity is severely constrained by the distribution of initial en-' 
dowments. They hardly generate any surplus over and above the sub-
sistence which would be utilized for working capital. Moreover they 
posses hardly any marketable collateral asset wh.ch would have yielded 
the entitlement to seek institutional finance. Since their capacity (loom 
and labour) to produce remain grossly underutilized under the society 
form of organization their attempt to replenish that, with borrowing 
from private credit market expose them further to acute unequal ex-
change. 
The state, on the other hand, has not been active in penetratino the 
market. Instead, its role is confined to (a) giving legal recognition to 
the society form of organization, and (b) occasional distribution of 
monetary benefits to the societies. Even within the narrow boundaries 
of action the lackadaisical attitude of the state to this industrial out-
work has been quite pronounced, not only regarding the review of but 
also in the implementation of the stated policies. Following the oOV-
ernment notifications, the societies allow 'festival discount s r (rebates) 
on their products which are supposed to be readily reimbursed by the 
apex body. However, the latter, particularly the KVIB, West Ben*d 
owes a huge sum of money to its affiliated societies on that accouut 
which has accumulated over last couple of years. This has resulted in 
crisis of funds for working capital of those societies. The financial 
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institutions, on the other hand, are very reluctant to extend credit to the 
societies whose creditworthiness is being seriously questioned while 
the apex organization has stopped flowing credit directly to the societ-
ies. Consequently, the system of transaction-on-credit in the sector as 
well as the upstream production lines has precipitated with more 
strength. To note, way back in 1968, the Committee appointed to as-
sess the progress of khadi and village industries, to make recommenda-
tions in order to strengthen and expand them, and to suggest any struc-
tural or constitutional changes, recommended that emphasis in future 
expansion of the khadi programme should be increasingly on organiz-
ing production in such a way that the element of subsidies, either direct 
or in the form of management grants and free weaving facilities, is 
reduced to the minimum possible. This would involve adoption of 
better techniques of spinning and weaving and reduction of overhead 
expenses of organization (GOI, Ministry of Commerce, 1968: Chapter 
VIII). Further, it noted that the emphasis in future 'should increasingly 
be on the positive18 rather than the protective aspects of development 
assistance' (ibid : p.93). The Committee also pointed out the need to 
check the disproportionate increase in the administrative staff of KVIC 
and KVIBs that led to disproportionate expenditure on administration. 
The Eighth Plan document states: 'main objectives of khadi and 
village (KVI) programmes during the Eighth Plan would be to create 
additional employment opportunities in the non-farm sector and to en-
sure increased wages/earnings to rural workers. For this purpose, it 
would be necessary to reorient khadi programme and identify thrust 
areas among village industries' (GOI, Planning Commission, 1992: 
Vol.11, p. 135). But the reorientation of the current programme in desir-
able directions seems to be quite a difficult task since only very limited 
'information' on the detailed aspects of the functioning of the khadi 
societies are available to the otherwise huge sized apex organizations, 
70 
Viz.. KVIB and KVIC19. The state of affairs of technical education in 
the textiles colleges also calls for a rev.ew; although handlooms pre-
dominate the weaving sector in the state there is little reflection of that 
m the curricula. Further, when intervention in the credit market seems 
to be socially desirable it hardly constitutes the agenda of the state 
The Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, for instance, has taken initiatives to 
organize the landless poor into groups of five, and ask each person to 
guarantee the repayment of a loan to any of the other four members A 
combination of collective collateral, close supervision and peer aroup 
pressure has resulted in around 95 per cent repayment rates Th,°s is a 
project ,n which the Bangladesh government has contributed 60 per 
cent of the initial paid-up capital, and the rest came from the savmoS of 
the borrowers themselves (Ashe and Cosslett, 1989; and UNDP, 1993. 
chapter 5). On the whole, the power of representation of the ar tsans 
being far too weak the sector has failed to evoke more active interven-
tion by the state. And, the post-colonial urban-biased development 
strategy of the state has, in fact, consolidated the persistent duality in 
the domestic economy. In place of the currently fashionable case for 
'state minimalism', or laissez-faire what is required is a broad view of 
democracy, allowing the possibility of state action guided by motives 
of public interest (Streeten, 1993; Bagchi, 1994). 
71 
APPENDIX I 
The Khadi Organization 
The Parliament enacted the Khadi and Village Industries Com-
mission (KVIC) Act, 1956, bringing into existence the Commission on 
1st April 1957, as a policy making-cwm-executive body. The central 
government has allowed the commission to function independently in 
matters like planning, organizing and implementing the programmes 
for the development of khadi and village industries, subject to^he 'rou-
tine' scrutiny of their Annual Budget proposals. As the central govern-
ment provides funds to the KVIC for carrying out its statutory func-
tions by appropriation made by the Parliament from the Consolidated 
Fund of India, the government owes a responsibility to the Parliament 
to give a proper account of not only the expenditure but also the extent 
to which the objectives for which the funds are sanctioned by the Par-
liament have been fulfilled. The Commission has its offices in almost 
all of the states. There are a number of Standing Committees such as 
the Certification Committee, Standing Finance Committee, etc. to as-
sist the Commission in the formulation of policies and problems relat-
ing to different aspects of implementation. The functions of the Certi-
fication Committee and the Standing Finance Committee are specifi-
cally laid down in the KVIC Rules, 1957, and the KVIC Regulations, 
1958, respectively. The working of the Commission has been assessed 
periodically by bodies like the Estimates Committee, the Public Ac-
counts Committee, the Khadi Evaluation Committee, the Working Group 
on Khadi and Village Industries, etc. 
Prior to the establishment of the Commission, the schemes relat-
ing to the development of khadi and village industries had to be imple-
mented by the All India Khadi and Village Industries Board in close 
cooperation with the state governments. However, during 1954-55 to 
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1959-60 statutory state Khadi and Village Industries Boards (KVIB) 
were set up in all the states. After the reorganization of the states, some 
of the State Boards were reorganized and a few new ones were consti-
The actual implementation of the development work in respect of 
khadt and village industries is carried out by the registered m o t i o n s 
(charitable socet.es) and the cooperative societies in the various states 
A society is free to decide from whom (KVIC or KVIB) it would obtain 
the certificate (of formal approval) which ultimately determines the 
direct source of institutional assistance. 
While the Commission provides finance for khadi societies to the 
State Boards, sufficient legal provisions do not exist in all the State 
Board Acts to enable the Commission to take adequate executive or 
legal action in case of breach of agreement or failure to repay loans 
The Commission can at best only refer those cases which come to their 
notice or are brought to their notice in regard to unsatisfactory workin* 
to the attention of the state governments, since only the latter can exert 
cise any control over the State Boards. The Commission has no locus 
standi in regard to the enforcement of its requirements. On the other 
hand, the Parliament hold the Commission responsible for the func-
tioning of the State Boards at least in relation to the funds advanced by 
them. J 
Allocations for the khadi and village industries programmes are 
recommended by the Planning Commission when formulating the Five 
Year Plan. Similarly, allocations are recommended for the Annual Plan 
every year which form the basis for the administrative Ministry to frame 
its budget provision for each financial year. The KVIC which receives 
grants and loans from the central government disburses, in turn, grants 
and loans to the State Boards, registered institutions, cooperative soci-
eties, etc., for implementation of the programmes. 
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These apart, the planning and organizing of training of persons 
engaged in the development of khadi and village industries is one of 
the most important functions of the Commission. Improvement in the 
technological conditions of production, and research in this direction 
also constitute parts of the KVIC - agenda. In fact, there is a Research 
Committee in the Commission for overall guidance of research in im-
proved technology for khadi, and considerable expenditure has been 
incurred by the Commission on such research. 
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Appendix Table I 
Retail market prices (as in August-November 1993) 
of the selected varieties of silk fabrics 





Khadi shop Private shop 


















Chawk-Islampur PLAIN CLOTH : 
Silk saree(DT)(Printed) 
— (ST)( " ) 
2300 - 2500 1750 - 1900 
2900 - 3500 2250 - 2700 
7000 - 8000 2900 - 3600 
1200 - 1600 1000 - 1200 
1200-• 2000 1100-- 1800 
1200-• 1800 1000-- 1200 
975 - 1400 500- 1100 
700- 1000 450 - 650 
800- 1100 550 -• 650 
1100- 1400 650 -• 800 
1200 - 1600 1000 - 1500 
1800 - 1900 1600 - 1700 
1775 - 1825 1400- 1700 
130- 200 110- 180 
605 r 635 
475 - 490 
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Matka saree 650 - 670 
Matka chadaar(2x0.91m.) 400 - 425 
SHIRTINGS - (per mtr.): 
Silk(TT)(lxl.l5)(Printed) 150- 157 
Silk-Matka(lxl.27 )(Bupta) 154- 191 
Matka (1x1.32) n o 
Matka-Silk(lxl . l4) 145 
SiIk-Jhoot( 1x0.91) 118-127 
Matka-Jhoot( " ) 136- 138 
Matka-Balkal( " ) 136 
Matka-Katia( 1x1.27) 210 
Notes : 
1) The retail , p r ices have been co l lec ted f rom 29 retail 
outlets in Calcutta, Baharampur (Murshidabad), and Malda 
town (Malda). Of these, 10 are Khadi retial outlets and the rest 
are private retailers. The retail outlets in Calcutta are located in 
areas like College Street, 
Shakespeare Sarani, Gariahat and Dakshinapan C.I.T. market 
(Dhakuria), and the list includes only the well known silk em-
poria. 
2) Some of the labels attached to particular sarees are those by 
which they are known to the weaver ( l ike, say, 'Funki 
saree', etc.). 
3) In the case of mixed fabrics the former denotes the type of warp 
while the latter is used as weft. 
4) 'Silk' refers to mulberry reeled silk while all the others referred 
to here such as, Matka, Baikal, Jhoot, etc. are spun silk. 
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5) ST = Single-ply; DT = Double-ply; TT = Three-ply. 
6) Till August 1991, sales tax at the rate of 8% ad valorem 
was used to be levied on the handloorn products which 
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NOTES 
1 • For data on output, see GOWB, Economic Review, 1992-93: p.55, 
Table 5.6; and, for data on exports from Calcutta (certification 
centrewise), see Indian Silk, various issues. The latter Source, 
however, mentions the quantities exported, in square metres only. 
On the other hand, the Economic Review mentions only the quan-
tities of raw silk (in kgs.) produced in the state. Hence, we have 
used appropriate 'conversion factors' for specific varieties of 
silkgoods in order to deduce the weights of yarn per square metre 
of respective fabrics. 
2. For discussion of Gandhi 's ideas as they relate to economics see 
Datta, 1978. 
3.- Market success, on the other hand, would be assumed as the abil-
ity of a collection of idealized competitive markets to achieve an 
equilibrium allocation of resources which is Pareto optimal 
(Ledyard, 1987). 
4. It is the cost of that quantity of cocoons required to produce one 
kilogram of raw silk. In other words, cost of cocoon per kg. = 
Kakeme cost/Calculated renditta (or, raw silk percentage). 
5. A figured fabric in which the figure is developed by floating the 
warp thread, the weft thread, or both, and bound in a more or°less 
irregular order. The ground is usually formed of a weave of simple 
character. 
6. In 1805, Joseph Marie Jacquard, a silk-loom designer, invented a 
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way of controlling the warp and weft threads automatically. He 
recorded each pattern by punching holes in a string of pasteboard 
cards. 
7. The division of warp threads into two layers to form a shed for the 
interlacement of longitudinal and transverse threads in a fabric. 
8. The Manchester-made Jacquard looms, largely used in Bishnupur, 
contain 300-400 hooks (and figuring needles). The figuring ca-
pacity (in terms of finesse and larger designs) of a Jacquard loom 
largely depends on the number of figuring needles available. 
9. The Planning Commission defines the poverty line as the monthly 
per capita total expenditure of Rs.49.09 for rural areas at 1973-74 
prices, at the national level, anchored on the per capita daily in-
take of 2,400 calories, with reference to the consumption pattern 
of 1973-74 (GOI, Planning Commission, 1993) Taking into ac-
count the state-specific consumer price index (food and non-food 
indices combined) for agricultural labourers, (GOWB, Economic 
Review, Statistical Appendix, 1992) the poverty line in 1992-93 in 
rural West Bengal must be around Rs.200. 
10. There are at least ten distinctly different and successive stages of 
'preparation' of the yarn including warping, prior to weaving. In-
creasingly, the weavers are replacing the family labour by hired 
workers at each of the stages, with a piece-rate wage system. 
11. I have a strong feeling that the figures of aggregate raw silk pro-
duction are overestimated in the Economic Review, GOWB 1992-
93. 
12. Chandrakanto Lalitmohon Resham Khadi Samity. 
13. Metric count = (Length in metres -f Weight in kilograms) x 1000. 
14. According to KVIC, Eastern Zonal Certification Committee, out 
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Of 1000 spinners only lOspin 80s., and only 2 spin 100s„in West 
Bengal. The situation was relatively better five years before ac-
cording to KVIC. 
15. The agricultural wages in this region are particularly low as com-
pared to the average wages prevailing in the relatively developed 
agricultural regions in the state. For instance, the wage for paddy-
sowing is Rs. 15 (plus tiffin) for a duration of labour from 8 a.m to 
4 p.m., and for harvesting it is only Rs.12 for the same hours of 
labour and for male workers only (as in 1993). 
16. This does not included the interest-cost on borrowed funds. 
17. According to KVIC, Eastern Zonal Certification Committee the 
accumulated funds out of this often exceeds the annual liabilities 
of interest payments, and the surplus is diverted to the 'Custom-
ers ' Benefit Fund'. 
18. The positive kinds of assistance include : the grants for trainino 
research and technical advice and assistance, and loans for work-
ing capital which should be increased according to requirements. 
19. Even on the numbers of operating societies, let alone other data 
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